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Volunteering Children: Parental
Commitment of Minors to
Mental Institutions
James W. Ellis*
In most states,' parents may commit their children to mental institutions without a hearing or any other form of judicial scrutiny. If

a parent wants a child committed, and a hospital will accept the child
as a patient, no legal authority will hear the child's protest. Moreover,
the child-patient has no standing to petition for release from the institution until he or she reaches the statutory age of majority. Until that
time any request for discharge must be made by the parent. Thus
* Fellow at the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Mental Health Law
Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Occidental College, 1968; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
1. This Article is concerned with the commitment of minors by their parents
and guardians to mental institutions. The fo.cus of the discussion will be on the commitment of mentally ill or emotionally disturbed children. References and analogy to
the treatment of the mentally retarded will be noted.
The following statutes permit parents and guardians to commit minors voluntarily
to mental institutions:
ALAS. STAT. § 47.30.020 (1970); Aiuz. REV. STAT. §§ 36-502, 36-504 (Supp.
1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-405 (1971); CAL. WEu'. & INST'Ns CODE § 6000 (West
1972); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 71-1-2 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (Supp.
1972), § 17-234 (1960); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-511, 21,512 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.465 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88.503.1, .2 (1971); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 33452 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-318, 66-320 (1973); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 911/2,
§ 5-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); INDIANA STAT. ANN. § 22-1205 (Supp. 1973); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2905 to 59-2907 (Supp. 1973); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.015
(1972); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2290 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59,
§ 11(g) (1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, §§ 10, 11 (Supp. 1973); McH.
COMp. LAws ANN. 330.19a (Supp. 1973); ANN. Mo. STAT. §§ 202.783, 202.790
(1972); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38-406.2 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 39,
§ 433.665 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 1964 §§ 135:22, 135:22-a (Supp. 1972);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-46, 30:4-48 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. 1953 ANN. §§ 34-22, 34-2-4(2) (1953); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 31.13 (McKinney Supp. 1973);
N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. §§ 25-03-01, 25-03-06(2) (1970); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.02 (Supp. 1973), § 5122.03(A)(2) (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 184
(Supp. 1973); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 426.220 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50, §§ 4402,
4403 (1969); CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. 1962 § 32-951 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-601 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 64-7-29 (1961); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.1-65 (Supp. 1973); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §§ 72.23.070 (Supp. 1973)1 W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-1, 27-4-3 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.10 (1957); WYO.
STAT. §§ 25-54 (Supp. 1973). Challenges to some of these statutes are discussed
infra, at notes 43-51, and 331-342.
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the minor admitted to a mental hospital on application of a parent is

denied access to virtually all procedural protections-notice, hearing,
appellate review, and habeas corpus-rights afforded all other patients

institutionalized against their will.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMITMENT PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES2

During the colonial and early national periods, allegedly insane

persons were incarcerated in jails and hospitals. Danger of injury to
themselves or to the public furnished the legal grounds for commit-

ment. Judicial reference to therapeutic considerations as grounds for
commitment appeared first in the case of In re Joseph Oakes.3 In
this 1845 Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw endorsed the idea

of involuntary commitment for the patient's benefit. 4 His suggestion,
however, was ignored by legislatures for a quarter of a century.

In

1869, Isaac Ray, the leading American psychiatrist of his time, called
for legislation to establish procedures and legal bases for commitment,
arguing that the common law decisions were confused and led to in-

consistent results. 5 He urged that new legislation be drafted to meet
Delaware and Texas require the child's consent for hospitalization. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(a)(c) (Supp. 1970); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 5547-23 (1958).
Mississippi and South Dakota have no provision for voluntary hospitalization, and
Vermont specifically excludes children from its voluntary commitment provision. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7503. Release of a child may be contingent on the consent of
a parent or guardian. Id. at § 8001. The statutes of six states make no mention of
age distinctions among voluntary patients. CODE OF ALABAMA RECOMPILED 1958 tit.
45, § 205 (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.41 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
28:51 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.03 (Supp. 1974) (Until amended, effective
Ian. 1, 1974, the Minnesota statute specifically required consent of the minor and parent or guardian. MINm. STAT. ANN. § 253A.03 (1971))_ REv. STAT. NEB. § 83-324
(1971); GEN. STAT. N.C. § 122-56.3 (1974); GEN. LAws R.I. § 26-2-18 (1968).
The assistance of Miriam Rokeach in locating these statutes is gratefully acknowledged.
2. This subsection presents only a few incidents in the history of civil commitment in this country. For a more thorough treatment of this subject see A. DErTsCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AmERICA (2d ed. 1949). During the last decade, historians
have devoted increasing attention to the history of mental illness and its treatment in
American history. See, e.g., N. DAiN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN TH-E UNITED STATES,
1789-1865 (1964); G. GROB, MENTAL INSTTUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO
1875 (1973) (the first of two projected volumes); G. GRon, THE STATE AND THE MENTALLY ILL: A HISTORY OF WORCESTER STATE HOSPITAL IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1830-1920
(1966); D. ROTHmAN, THm DIsCOvERY OF THE ASyLuM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC

(1971).

3. 8 Law Rptr. 122 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1845) cited in N. YrR , THE
To BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 66 n.62 (1971).
4. N. KrrruE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED
APY 66 (1971).

5. Ray, Confinement of the Insane, 3 Am. L. REv. 193 (1869).

RIGHT
THER-
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three objectives: 1) prompt treatment beneficial to the patient, 2)
protection of the privacy of those involved in commitment, and 3) protection of individuals from wrongful imprisonment." When the statutes were subsequently drafted, many of them placed the strongest
emphasis on Ray's third objective. This was due, in part, to the highly
publicized case of Mrs. Dorothy Packard.
Mrs. Packard's husband, a Calvinist preacher, had her committed
in 1860 after she publicly disagreed with his theological views. Upon
release, she became an energetic crusader for the rights of asylum inmates. She won passage of statutes providing jury trials for every patient already committed (in Illinois), recognizing the right to express
insane-sounding opinions without fear of resulting commitment, (in
Massachusetts), and establishing visiting committees, including female
representation, to inspect insane asylums (in Iowa and Maine). In
Washington, D.C. she lobbied for congressional legislation to protect
the postal rights of mental patients. She wrote and published MODERN PERSECUTION, OR INSANE ASYLUMS UNVEILED, in seven volumes.
Mrs. Packard's case and Charles Reade's 1863 novel Hard Cash, in
which the young hero was committed by business associates seeking
his modest fortune, created support for legislation safeguarding the
rights of persons faced with commitment proceedings. 7
Prior to -the growth of this sentiment, procedural requirements
had been aimed primarily at excluding paupers and vagabonds from
institutions, rather than at protecting sane persons from wrongful commitment.8 But in the late nineteenth century, the specter of "innocent"' persons being railroaded into hospitals spurred the passage of
restrictive commitment statutes. 10 These laws typically tightened the
definition of those who could be committed, and often provided procedural safeguards such as the right to jury trial in commitment proceedings.
A reaction against these statutes occurred in -the 1940's and
1950's, after psychiatry had finally attained stature as a profession.
6. Id. at 208.
7. Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerationsin Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178, 1192 n.61 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Yale
Comment]. See also, Dewey, The Jury Trial Law for Commitment of the Insane in
Illinois (1867-1893), and Mrs. E. P. W. Packard, Its Author, 69 AM. J.INSANITY 571
(1913).
8. N. KrrrRuu, supra note 4, at 64.
9. The recurrent use of the term "innocent" in the literature to describe sane
persons is a puzzling phenomenon. For a discussion of innocence as a key to the selfimage of those who are mentally ill, see R. MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE (1972).
10. N. Krrrm, supra note 4, at 64. Besides prescribing extremely formal procedures, these laws also had the effect of protecting hospital officials from charges of
malfeasance and wrongful detention. Id.
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Psychiatrists argued that it was countertherapeutic to subject the mentally ill to humiliating and disturbing judicial hearings in which relatives and friends testified for commitment. 1 Both psychiatrists and
legal scholars argued that commitment laws created cumbersome and
formalistic mechanisms ill-suited to the needs of the mentally ill and
the standards of modem psychiatric practice. While arguing for statutory change, scholars dismissed popular fears of railroading as "the
fancies of novelists and the delusions of the less than sane,"12 and suggested that society's obsession with the possibility of wrongful commitments was "a defense mechanism to rationalize our wretched neglect
of those actually mentally ill.' 3 An influential Comment argued that
the issues of legal competence and commitment had been confused,
leading to a situation in which procedural rights, appropriately applied
to protect the patient's property interests, were being inappropriately
applied -to the issue of commitment, which involved no "civil rights,"
only the question "whether a mentally sick person should be hospitalized."' 4 This movement for due process standards less rigorous -than
those applied in criminal cases led to statutory changes in many states
including the abolition of jury trials and possible waiver of rights to
notice and to be present at the commitment hearing when the exercise
of those rights would be upsetting to the patient. There occurred a
general shifting of the power to commit from judges to psychiatrists.' 5
Two conflicting values have dominated the debate on commitment laws: the fear of wrongfully committing sane persons, and the
desire to streamline commitment procedures in the interest of protecting the therapeutic process. Each viewpoint carries enormous emotional weight, and adherents on both sides are not particularly happy
with the involuntary commitment statutes now in force in most states."6
There is one development, however, which has been greeted enthusiastically by proponents of both viewpoints-the trend toward increasing voluntary admissions to mental hospitals.'Y This phenomenon has
11. For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanying notes 255-264 infra.
12. Kadish, A Case Study in the Signification of Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill, 9 W. POL. Q. 93, 103 (1956).
13. Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. Rlv. 274, 293
(1953).
14. Yale Comment, supra note 7, at 1189-90.
15. Some of these statutes have been declared unconstitutional as violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinex, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
16. N. Krrrn, supra note 4, at 83.
17. The first voluntary admission statute was passed by Massachusetts in 1881.
Yale Comment, supra note 7, at 1201. As early as 1924, a major psychiatric journal
had published an article advocating voluntary admission laws. Overholser, The Voluntary Admission Law: Certain Legal and Psychiatric Aspects, 3 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 475
(1924). By 1939, 32 states had voluntary statutes, and by 1947, ten more states had
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been hailed by the "streamlining" advocates because it requires no legal procedure at all for a large and increasing number of patients, and

by the "anti-railroading" advocates because it is presumed that railroaded persons would not consent to admit themselves voluntarily.18
Voluntary admissions also allow treatment of mental illness at its earliest stages, before statutory requirements for involuntary commitment
are met, and before relatives feel forced to take the drastic step of

seeking commitment. A person who voluntarily seeks hospitalization
is also considered a more promising candidate for treatment since he
or she has evidenced a desire to "get better."

Finally, voluntary ad-

mission is desirable because it does not immediately place the patient
in an adversary relationship with his family and with those who are

about to provide treatment.' 9

II
VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF JUVENILES

In most states the new voluntary admission statutes did not include separate provisons for juveniles.

As late as 1952, only nine

states had laws allowing parents to voluntarily commit 'their children."0
The Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill promulgated by the National Institutq of Mental Health 2' encouraged the
trend, and today most states permit "voluntary" commitment of chil-

dren by their parents.22 The widespread adoption of these laws has
been accompanied by an increase in the number of young mental paadopted them. Yale Comment, supra note 7, at 1201. After promulgation of a Draft
Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Publication
No. 51, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Draft Act], by the National Institute of Mental
Health in 1951, almost every state had some form of voluntary admission law. See
note 1 supra. Among its other provisions, the Draft Act outlined a set of procedures
to be followed in the hospitalization of voluntary patients-both adult and juvenile.
18. Kittrie notes that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients
may be less than clear in many cases. N. KrrirE, supra note 4 at 72. See also Gilboy,
"Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. RnV. 429 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
19. Proponents perceived one disadvantage with voluntary admission schemes:
The patient, once admitted, might become restless or dissatisfied and walk out before
treatment had begun. As a result, most states adopted statutes providing that patients
admitted voluntarily could be held in the hospital for a specified period of time after
giving notice of their intention to withdraw from the institution. E.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (1972) (ten day requirement). Thus, an adult voluntary patient
who wishes to be released makes the request in the form of a "ten day notice." Under
current statutes, juveniles can be released only after their parents have submitted such
a notice. Id.
20. Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MicH. L. Rnv. 837, 855-56 n.45
(1952).
21. See note 17 supra.
22. See note 1 supra.
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tients. For example, in 1954 the proportion of the California state
hospital population under the age of 21 was 1.3 percent; in 1969, pa-

tients under 21 constituted 9.2 percent of the hospital population.2
Nationally, the number of hospitalized middle-aged patients has been

decreasing while the number of patients between ages 15 and 24 has
increased, the number of patients under age 15 increasing most
24

sharply.

While research is not available to demonstrate the precise relationship between hospitalization rates and the availability of voluntary

commitment procedures, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
safeguards afforded adults who face commitment play a role in reducing the number of older persons so committed. Conversely, the ease

with which parents can commit their children may well be related to
the increasing number of young people in mental hospitals.

At the

very least, the "voluntary" commitment of children by their parents
has created a large2 5 class of patients who, unlike involuntary patients,
are unable to seek release, and who, unlike adult voluntary patients,
2
lack the opportunity to leave.
A.

The DistinctionsBetween Voluntary and
Involuntary Commitment

Despite alleged therapeutic advantages, 27 several authors have
questioned whether there is any difference in fact between a patient
23. CAL. ASSEMBLY SELECT Comm. ON MENTALLY ILL AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN, REPORT ON SERVICES FOR THE HANDICAPPED AND MENTALLY DISORDERED CHILDREN 146 (1970).
24. Harris, Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers, 55 A.B.A.J. 65, 67
(1969).
25. It is difficult to find accurate figures for the number of young mental patients, and impossible to find a breakdown of how they were committed. Perhaps the
most realistic estimate of the total figure is 33,000 children in public and private mental hospitals and another 26,000 in residential treatment centers. Ginsberg, An Examination of the Civil Rights of Mentally Ill Children, 52 CHILD WELFARE 14, 15 (1973).
26. This paper will deal only with juveniles who are admitted as voluntary patients, and will not focus on the situation of those children who are involuntarily committed, for whatever reason, under normal commitment procedures. However, some
parents pass up the easier voluntary route. In New York, for example, the demand
for admission is so great in some of the children's units of state hospitals that children
will not be admitted unless they are judicially certified (committed) when they first
enter. Tim SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO STUDy COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE AssoCATION OF nm BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YoRi, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS
75 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NEw YORK BAR].
27. Some of the advantages which have been claimed for voluntary admission
procedures have been discussed above. See text at notes 16-19, supra. Proponents
also argue that nurses and attendants often find voluntary patients more attractive than
those involuntarily committed. Since voluntary patients are thought to have recoguized
the need for treatment and initiated the process, they are considered easier to work
with. These staff attitudes can have a positive impact on a patient's self-image and
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who is voluntarily admitted and one who is involuntarily committed.
A voluntary patient may have agreed to 'hospitalization because of the
threat of involuntary proceedings, family pressure, or exploitation of
his or her lack of information.2 8 Discussing the attorney's function
in commitment cases, Professor Fred Cohen argues that one cannot
take -the passivity commonly observed in prospective patients "to be
a meaningful acceptance of commitment."2 9 Thomas Szasz, noting
that voluntary patients can be held against their will for the length
of a statutory notice period-during which -time they can be converted
to involuntary status by the initiation of commitment proceedings,
concludes that "[tiruly voluntary hospitalization is virtually nonexistent in public mental institutions in the United States." 80 Professor
Nichols Kittrie casts further suspicion upon the distinction by noting
that a patient committed involuntarily may not have been subjected to
any compulsion, nor objected to the commitment; involuntary commit31
ment may simply imply a lack of volition on the part of the patient.
It has been suggested that the term "non-protesting admission" more
accurately describes the situation of a person who neither seeks nor
opposes hospitalization.
Important differences in the rights a patient enjoys do depend
on which side of this distinction he or she falls. The first of these
differences is the level of mental illness which will bring about hospitalization. Under most statutes, a voluntary patient may be admitted if
he or she and the admitting physician agree that hospitalization would
be beneficial. A more rigorous standard, dangerousness to oneself or
to others, is sometimes applied in cases of involuntary commitment.,,"
Necessary and desired treatment should not be denied a person just
because he or she is not ill enough to be involuntarily committed. Nor
should relatives or the state have the power -to commit a person because treatment might be beneficial.
It has been suggested that commitment statutes should contain
two different standards to govern these disparate circumstances:
on the success of his or her treatment. Denzin and Spitzer, Patient Entry Patterns
in Varied Psychiatric Settings, 50 MENTAL HYGIENE 257 (1966). For these reasons,
the law has been urged to encourage voluntary admissions, and hospital personnel who
refuse to accept voluntary patients have been vigorously criticized. Blackley, Judicial
Intervention as a Psychiatric Thearpy Tool, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 506, 513 (1966);
NEw YoRK BAR, supra note 26, at 75 n.26.
28. Roth, Cut Through the Looking Glass, 3 ROUGH IMES 9 (Nov. 1972).
29. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 424, 447 (1966).
30. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PsYCHIATRY 40, 83 (1963).
31. N. KITMrE, supranote 4, at 72.
32. Some states allow the involuntary commitment of persons in need of treatment, whether dangerous or not. See text accompanying notes 366-67 infra.
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Cure is at best difficult with an unwilling patient. Compulsory process must be reserved only for those who pose a likelihood of danger
to life or property. Although the need for early treatment, before an
individual becomes a source of danger, is acknowledged, such treatment should be accomplished through the encouragement of truly
voluntary hospitalization or ambulatory treatment in community clinics. 33
Given these assumptions, it is difficult to argue that minors should not
be allowed to initiate their own treatment. But under voluntary admission statutes, even a minor meeting the lower voluntary admission
standard may only seek care through parental application.
Another important legal implication of the voluntary-involuntary
distinction is the right of voluntary patients to be released after giving
the statutorily required notice.34 Voluntary adult patients who have
given notice cannot be detained unless hospital officials convince a
court that the patient meets -the standards for involuntary commitment.
An involuntarily committed adult patient may seek release in the
courts through habeas corpus or through the periodic review of commitments which is required by some statutes. 35 Here, as in juvenile
court waiver proceedings, "the child receives the worst of both
worlds." ' The child cannot give notice of an intention to leave without approval of the parents who sought the initial commitment, and
there are no legal grounds upon which to challenge hospitalization unless the voluntary commitment statutes themselves are challenged.
Short of bringing suit on constitutional grounds or seeking favorable
statutory construction, the juvenile patient who seeks discharge has no
recourse except to those who agreed to -the original hospitalizationparents and hospital authorities.3 7 Here the child's position bears no
resemblance to that of either the adult voluntary or involuntary patient;
rather, it is uniquely restrictive.
Some statutes provide rights to involuntary patients which are
denied to voluntary patients, including juveniles. New York's law
provides that involuntary patients are entitled to automatic periodic
33. N. KrrnuE, supra note 4, at 100-01. See also Comment, Hospitalization of
the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act
of 1966, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 300, 307 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dickinson Comment].
34. See note 19 supra.
35. Most periodic review statutes place the burden of proof on the hospital to
show the need for continued hospitalization, but a few are modelled on habeas corpus
proceedings, and place the burden on the patient to show sanity and harmlessness. B.
ENNis & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 46 (1973).

notes 359-60 infra.
36. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
37. Dickinson Comment, supra note 33, at 313.

See also text at
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In addition, the Mental Health Infor-

mation Service39 is notified of each patient's commitment and is
charged to study and review both admission and retention. The statute does not extend these rights to voluntary patients. With In re
Buttonow,4 ° New York's highest court held that a patient who had
been transferred from involuntary to voluntary status by hospital au-

thorities was deprived of both due process and equal protection, and
was therefore entitled to a hearing on her suitability to be a voluntary
patient. Believing in the benefits of voluntary hospitalization, the
court stopped short of calling all such transfers unconstitutional. Still,
the majority's language and construction of the statute suggest that

similar voluntary-involuntary discriminations may be suspect:
"A narrow, illiberal reading of the statute would leave a voluntary
patient without a disinterested review of his detention, would deprive
him of judicial and other valuable protections afforded involuntary
patients and, by reason of that, deny him constitutional rights to
'4
which he is entitled." 1
But tens of thousands of children "voluntarily committed" face these

very disabilities.
B.

Legal Challenges to Juvenile Voluntary Status

Juveniles admitted to hospitals by their parents under voluntary

admission statutes have the rights of neither voluntarily nor involuntarily committed adult patients. 42 Before proceeding to further analy-

sis of what their legal status is and what it should be, notice will be
taken of recent challenges to voluntary juvenile admissions. Recently,
legal challenges have begun to exact some recognition of children's
rights.
38. N.Y. MENTAL HYGENE LAW § 31.35 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
39. Note, The New York Mental Health Information Service, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
672 (1967). See Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALI. L. REv. 816 (1974) (this issue).
40. 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968).
41. Id. at 393, 244 N.E.2d at 681, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
42. In view of the lack of juvenile patients' rights generally, mention should be
made of one statute which purports to give special treatment to young patients. When
Pennsylvania revised its commitment statute in 1966, it removed a section of the 1951
Act which provided that a juvenile voluntary patient could not be held more than 30
days without obtaining a court order. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1164(a)(1) (Supp.
1965). While the new Act has no such provision, it does provide that the voluntary
patient who is a minor is to be advised every 60 days that he is a voluntary patient.
Adult patients are not so advised. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(d). One author
has noted the absurdity of informing juvenile patients (who cannot leave without parental application) of their "right to leave," while not so informing adult patients, who
are free to leave. Dickinson Comment, supra note 33, at 314.
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In In re Lee,43 the Illinois voluntary admission statute44 was challenged on due process and equal protection grounds. Plaintiffs were
wards of juvenile court, having previously been adjudicated neglected,
and the state, acting in locol parentis,4 5 had the children admitted to
hospitals. The court did not reach the constitutional arguments of

plaintiffs, but construed the statute to permit juvenile patients to seek
and obtain their own release without parental consent.
A Connecticut court recently reached a similar result in the case

of Melville v. Sabbatino.46 The court held that since persons between

the ages of 16 and 18 could apply for their own hospitalization and

release under Connecticut's statute, logic required that persons in that
age group have the right to sign themselves out of a hospital even
if their parents had signed them in.4 7 While the Melville holding is
limited ,to the release of emancipated 16- and 17-year-olds under the
state statute, the court's opinion makes clear that even the commitment
of unemancipated minors by their parents would be subject to the due
process requirements4 8 of In re Gault. 9

Tennessee's statute permitting the voluntary commitment of mentally retarded children by their parents was recently struck down by
a three-judge federal court. In Saville v. Treadway,0 the court noted
the possible conflict of interest between the parents and the mentally
retarded child, and held that the lack of procedural safeguards in the
juvenile voluntary commitment procedure violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.r1
43. No. 68 (ID) 1362 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Juv. Div., Ill. Feb. 29, 1972) abstracted in 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 284 (Aug.-Sept. 1972). No. 68 (JD) 1362 (Cook
County Cir. Ct., Juv. Div., Ill. Aug. 24, 1972) (ordering the preparation of plans for
placement of discharged children and requiring monthly reports evaluating each ward's
progress) abstracted in 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 575 (Jan. 1973).
44. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 /, §§ 5-1 through 5-3 (1969).
45. While this fact may have blunted potential family-privacy arguments in defense of the statute, it did not figure overtly in the argument or decision of the case.
46. 30 Conn. Supp. 320 (Super. Ct. 1973), also reported at 42 U.S.L.W. 2242
(Nov. 6, 1973).
47. 30 Conn. Supp. at 325.
48. Id. at 322.
49. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Similar constitutional issues have been raised against
Pennsylvania's voluntary juvenile commitment provisions in Bartley v. Haverford State
Hospital, a class action brought on behalf of a number of juvenile patients, in which
a three-judge federal court is being asked to find that the .commitment and release provisions of the statute deprive young patients committed by their parents of both due
process and equal protection. No. 72-2272 (E.D. Pa., filed November 16, 1972). The
complaint and plaintiffs' memorandum of points and authorities are cited at 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 640 (Feb. 1973).
50. - F. Supp. - (M.D. Tenn., Civil Action No. 6969, March 8, 1974).
51. While Saville dealt with the commitment of mentally retarded children, the
constitutional issues do not differ greatly from those presented by the case of parental
commitment of mentally ill juveniles.
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Challenges to statutes providing for the voluntary commitment of
juveniles by their parents are likely to increase in the near future.

Courts have shown great interest in both juvenile rights5 2 and the
rights of mental patients53 in recent years; the confluence of these -two
concerns makes this a likely setting for judicial scrutiny. Given the
artificiality of the voluntary-involuntary distinction, and 'the fact that
children are denied the rights of both adult classes, convincing argu-

ments will have to be advanced in defense of a system which allows
juvenile patients so few civil liberties.5 4

The remaining sections of

this Article will examine some important considerations regarding
the juvenile commitment system, and propose an alternative statutory

framework in which young people are accorded a larger role in the
commitment decisions which affect their own lives. Attention will
be focused upon the roles of parent, psychiatrist, child, and attorney.

mrr
THE PARENT: EMERGING LIMITATIONS ON THE PARENTAL ROLE

A.

The Decision to Commit

The significance of the role parents play in the commitment of
children is difficult to overstate: The parent alone may seek hospitalization and release of -the child. Presently the only limitation on parental discretion is the requirement of concurrence by the committing
authority, usually the administrator of the hospital or the admitting
physician. These officials frequently fail to exercise independent
judgment, however, generally deferring to the wishes of the parents."
Many institutions may investigate a proposed commitment no further
than the information supplied by the family of the proposed patient. 0
Probably, few parents are guilty of railroading their children into
52. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966).
53. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
54. There are three justifications that could be used for forcing hospitalization
on young patients who would not be subject to such commitment if they were adults.
(1) Children are not old enough to make a mature judgment about whether they need
treatment or not, and therefore someone else must make it for them. (2) Children
are subject to the decisions made for them by their parents, and a commitment decision
is within the scope of parental authority. (3) Mental disorders are much more tractable when the patient is young, and therefore there is a greater state interest in forcing
treatment on mildly ill young persons than on mildly ill adults.
55. See text accompanying notes 132-44.
56. Even where the psychiatrist does not make a conscious decision to defer to
the family's judgment, the home atmosphere influences the diagnosis and recommendation. For a discussion of the psychiatrist's role, see text accompanying notes 132-64
infra.
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asylums in the manner that spurred nineteenth-century reform movements. Still, the emergence of a countercultural lifestyle among
young people in recent years, and the troubled reaction of some parents lends support to the suggestion that some parents have resorted
to voluntary commitment procedures in order to sanction behavior of
which they disapproved.5 7 Parents may be confused, bewildered, and
saddened by what they perceive as their child's "crazy" behavior."e
In individual cases there may be some validity 'to the parents' belief
in a connection between acceptance of countercultural styles and emotional difficulties, but parents' own visceral reaction to the different
lifestyle may color their diagnosis.59 Where parental action does result in unjustified commitment, it is probably not due -to malevolence
or filial hatred but to a feeling more akin to irritation or embarrassment over the child's unconventional behavior.6 0 The level of irritation or embarrassment can become acute and reach a level where parents become desperate.61
Since parents make the decision to commit their -child at a time
of great emotional stress, the decision may be made without a careful
consideration of possible alternatives.6 2 The availability of alternatives is in large part determined by the socioeconomic status of the
57. B. ENNs & L. SIEGEL, supra note 35, at 38.
58. These observations reflect the author's experience of working with adolescent
patients and their parents at the Yale Psychiatric Institute, New Haven, Connecticut,
from August 1969 to August 1971. It has been noted that the motives of parents seeking the institutionalization of their retarded children include the interests of other children in the family, the mental and physical frustration of the parents, economic strain
resulting from caring for the child at home, the stigma of retardation, hostility resulting
from the burdens of caring for the child, the parents' success-oriented expectations of
the child, and the advice of doctors who are ignorant of other treatment possibilities.
Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 133, 139

(1972). Many of these same factors may motivate parents who seek to have a child
hospitalized as mentally ill.
59. Cf. In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), holding that a parent could not force her unmarried 16-year-old daughter to have an abortion.
60. Yale Comment, supra note 7, at 1182-83.
61. Letter from Elizabeth Strutzel (Clinical Specialist, Yale Psychiatric Institute)
to the CALIFORNIA LAW REvIEw, March 30, 1973.
62. Provision of impartial, expert psychiatric counseling might mitigate this problem, but parents rarely have access to this form of advice. A survey of parents of
children at Napa State Hospital's children's unit, for example, indicated that the decision to commit the child was influenced by private physicians or psychiatrists in only
36% of the cases. Probation officers, welfare workers, and public school officials influenced 73%. COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN, REPORT
ON SERVICES FOR THlE HANDICAPPED AND MENTALLY DISORDERED CHILDREN 227 (1970).
See also Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakal & Diamond, Legal Planning for the Mentally
Retarded: The CaliforniaExperience, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 438, 516 (1972). While private physicians are not uniquely qualified to advise parents on possible alternatives, institutional officials may not have the time or motivation to seek out "less restrictive alternatives" to hospitalization.
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family. While no studies have been found which focus on the relationship of social class to early or late hospitalization, it has been observed that upper-middle-class families have access to alternatives short of hospitalization-such as special schools, long vacations,
and private psychiatric treatment-which are not available to families
from lower socioeconomic groups.63 The poor, when faced with acute
family problems, do not have recourse to these facilities; they also have
the least access to informed assistance in making decisions involving
their child's illness and possible commitment.
B.

ParentalAuthority and Family Privacy

Thomas Szasz argues that a source of parental power is the law's
interest in shoring up the institution of the family, and that hospitalization serves this interest by reducing family tensions "without disrupting
the moral integrity of the family as an institution." 4 Thus, unlike
the social institutions of divorce and separation, commitment maintains the legal structure of the family, and promotes the illusion that
nothing is irremediably wrong with the relationships involved. Szasz
concludes:
Thus, for the individual, involuntary hospitalization ensures the
maintenance of the family as a good institution. For society, it ensures the maintenance of family relationships, loyalties, and responsibilities as positive moral values. Our whole social system needs the
safety valve that commitment laws provide. Without it, our traditional ideas about the duties and rights of family members would
have to be reexamined, reassessed, and changed.05
One does not have to share Szasz's ideology(6 to agree that commitment laws, and juvenile commitment provisions in particular, have as
their paramount objective the maintenance of family autonomy in dealing with aberrational behavior within the family. As a result, the
authority granted to parents in the area of commitment to mental hospitals is extremely broad. Can such a broad grant of power be justified? To justify such an extensive grant of power, supporters of broad
parental prerogatives point to analogous areas of the law and argue
that the state should continue to decline to intrude into the parent-child
relationship.
63. T. Lmz, S. FLECK & A. CORNELLISON, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY 131
(1965) [hereinafter cited as T. Linz]. See generally A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLiCii,
SOCIAL CLAss AND MENTAL ILLNESs (1958); Weihofen, Mental Health Services for the
Poor,54 CALnF. L. REV. 920 (1966).
64. T. SzAsZ, supra note 30, at 154.
65. Id.
66. E.g., T. SZASz; THE MYTH op MENTAL ILLNESs (1961).
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The ConstitutionalFramework

Adherents to the belief in parental control within the family may
rely on a line of United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with
parent-state relationships. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 7 the Court held
unconstitutional a Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of any subject in a language other than English, 68 and the teaching of any language other than English in the first eight grades of school. In Pierce
v. Society of Sisters"" the Court struck down an Oregon statute requiring parents and guardians of children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to send them to public schools. The Court noted:
The fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 70
The Court preserved the authority of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of their children.
While numerous decisions have upheld parental power as against
the state, this power is not without constitutional limits. In Prince v.
Massachusetts,71 the guardian of a nine-year-old child was convicted
of violating state child labor laws by furnishing a child with magazines,
knowing that the child would sell them unlawfully, and by permitting
a child in her custody to "work" contrary to law.72 The guardian and
child were Jehovah's Witnesses and had been distributing copies of
Watchtower and Consolation, engaging in what they considered to be
religious duty. 73 The Court noted that the recognition of parental prerogatives in Pierce had been founded on the notion of family privacy
protected from state intervention, and then added:
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest
...
. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in
74
many other ways.
67. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (reversing the conviction of a teacher, using the substantive due process analysis of that era).
68. The state court construed the statute as not proscribing Latin, Greek, or Hebrew. Id. at 400-01.
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70. Id. at 535.
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
72. Id. at 160.
73. Id. at 161-63.

74. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
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While the Court may continue to regard the exercise of parental discretion as an important interest, under certain conditions strong public policy may also require that parental discretion be limited.
2.

ParentalTort Immunity

One crystalization of the noninterventionist policy of the state is
the parental tort immunity doctrine. Not recognized at common law,
it is a modem statutory creation intended to protect the parent-child
relationship as "a unique kind of social unit different from all other
groups. ' 75 The notion that immunity helps -to preserve family harmony has been attacked by many commentators. Dean Prosser disparaged parental immunity as based "on the theory that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family and ,respect for the parent,
even though it be rape or a brutal beating, and even though the relation itself has been terminated by death before the suit.'
While the
doctrine is not dead, it is clearly on the decline; courts have either
abolished it outright or weakened it by an increasing number of ex77
ceptions.
While it seems unlikely that voluntary commitment of children
by their parents will lead to tort suits by children against parents, 8
the parental immunity doctrine is nevertheless illuminating as an example of the family privacy notion under which courts decline to involve themselves in disputes within the family unit. 79 Although many
courts have retreated from specific extensions of this policy, the basic
reluctance remains, and must be overcome if courts are to take an
active part in limiting parents' rights to place their children in mental
hospitals. In -attempting to persuade judges to abandon their reticence, support can be drawn from a variation on Prosser's observation:
Family tranquility and the parent-child relationship will already have
been disrupted both by the child's behavior and by the parents' decision to seek commitment, which implies that they can no longer cope
with the situation. Judicial nonintervention supports the integrity
75. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 719, 215 N.Y.9.2d 35
(1961); overruled by Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
76. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 866 (4th ed. 1971).
77. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The
State, pt. 11, Parental Power, 4 FAM. L.Q. 410, 427 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Kleinfield II].
78. It is of historical interest to note that the parental immunity doctrine was
first expounded in an 1891 suit by a Mississippi child against her parents for false imprisonment in an insane asylum. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891).
79. J. GOLDSTEiN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CMLD 50 (1973).
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of the family unit only in the sense that it allows the parents in a dysfunctional family to deny the existence of real family problems by
"blaming" them on the illness of one of their children. 0
3.

Consent to Medical Treatment

Consent for surgery and other medical treatment is a widely recognized parental prerogative. While the cases which most strongly
81
support parental power in this area involve very young children, it
is nevertheless thought to be the general rule that in determining the
need for surgical or hospital treatment, the personal consent of the
child need not be obtained." In certain circumstances, however, judicial limitations have been placed upon parental discretion-not so
much in the form of recognition of objections by the child, as in giving
effect to the state's interest as parens patriae.83 For example, where
the parents' religious beliefs prevent the child from receiving needed
medical treatment, the state may take custody of the child in order
to provide that treatment."4 While the body of case law on consent
to surgery and other medical treatment does not explicitly recognize
a new role for children, the limitation of parental power in the name
of the state may have the practical effect of upholding the child's interest.
The parens patriae doctrine allows courts to adjust the parentchild relationship in order to prevent harm to the child. Parenspatriae
should, at a minimum, permit courts -to review parental discretion in
commitment cases where wrongful and unnecessary confinement may
also prove very damaging to the child."8 Courts -have ordered psychiatric treatment for children over the objection of their parents.8 6 It
seems inconsistent to maintain that courts do not have authority to prevent or terminate such treatment where it can be shown to be inappropriate.
80. See text accompanying notes 112-27 infra.
81. E.g., Weston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785
(1921); Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962).
82. 59 Am. Jur. 2d Medical Care § 15 (1971). See also Bonner v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (consent of a 15-year-old boy held not a valid defense to
an assault and battery action).
83. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
84. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824. Cf. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (holding that a court cannot order a surgical operation over parental objection unless the parents are found unfit). Other courts, as in Labrenz, equate refusal to allow the operation
with parental unfitness.
85. Cf. Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955) (Judge
Fuld dissenting).
86. E.g., In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950).
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IncorrigibilityLaws

Courts have also had to deal with strongly entrenched parental
power in interpreting laws dealing with what are variously termed
stubborn, beyond-control, or predelinquent children.8 7 Of course
most of the means parents use to obtain the obedience of their children do not directly involve public law."" But at a certain level of
disobedience, the state is willing to intervene in support of parental
decisions. The development of intervention laws accompanied the
growth of the juvenile court system in the beginning of this century, °
the rehabilitative goals of the child-saving movement were thought to
be best served by gaining control over a child before he or she committed acts which would be declared criminal.
Court action in beyond-control cases often results in taking custody of the child from
the parents, because they can no longer control the child's actions."
Beyond the immediate purpose of stabilizing what may be an emergency situation for 'the child, the ultimate goal of incorrigibility statutes
is to shore up the family's controls, which have broken down.12 But
while the aim of these laws is the establishment of family cohesiveness,
Professor Aidan Gough argues that they often accomplish precisely the
opposite: by institutionalizing the child or otherwise removing him
from the family setting, the laws defeat their own purpose by shifting
the focus away from 'the family and its problems. 3 In re Henry G.,0"
a recent California case in which -a mother sought -to have her son
adjudicated beyond parental control, held that the juvenile court in
such cases -must conduct an investigation thorough enough to enable
the court to determine whether the child's behavior is merely a "manifestation of intra-family parent-child conflict;"0 5 the child must be allowed to show that the breakdown of parental control results from the
parents' failings rather than the child's. Henry G. contrasts with the
usual presumption of incorrigibility laws: that a failure of family dis87. For an indication that these laws have venerable predecessors-and interesting doctrinal origins-see Rotenberg and Diamond, The Biblical Conception of Psychopathy: The Law of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 7 J. HisT. BnHAv. Sci. 29
(1971).
88. Kleinfeld IT, supra note 77, at 424-25.
89.

Cf. id. at 434-35.

90. THE PREDENT's COMnSSION ON LAW ENFoRcEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 22

(1967).
91.
92.
L.J 182,
93.

See also A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAvERS (1969).
E.g., CAL. WELF.AND INST'NS CODE § 601.
Gough, The Beyond Control Child and the Right to Treatment, 16 ST. Louis
197 (1971).
Id. at 190-92, 195. See discussion of pathology in the family accompanying

notes 120-35 infra.

94. 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (2d Dist. 1972).
95. Id. at 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
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cipline can only be cured by blaming it on the child and removing
him or her from the family. Gough's criticism of beyond-control laws
is also applicable to a system which responds to family disruption by
allowing parents to "exper' an aberrational child from the family into
a mental institution.
5. PotentialConflicts of Interests
Cases of beyond-control children exemplify the essential conflict
of interests between parents and their children. Where the parent
is the complainant against an allegedly disobedient child, courts have
recognized that the interests of the parents and child, at least for the
purposes of the proceeding, are in potential conflict. For example,
in Marsden v. Commonwealth,9" the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that due process, as interpreted in Gault, required that
the accused child be provided with separate counsel. Even before
Gault, courts had recognized that there were some situations in which
the interests of parents and child were in conflict, both in certain financial transactions 97 and in cases of alleged incorrigibility. For example, In re Sippy,98 in which a mother charged her 17-yearold daughter with being habitually beyond her control,9" held that the
mother could neither control her daughter's legal representation nor
waive the doctor-patient privilege for her.10 Both rulings were based
on the adversary role the parent assumed by entering the complaint
in the commitment proceedings. Sippy teaches that where a parent
seeks to have a child committed to a hospital, the law's customary deference to the judgment of the parent cannot be allowed to obscure
the fact that the parent and child may have opposing interests, and
that to entrust the child's procedural and substantive rights to the parent effectively abolishes those rights.
The recognition by some courts that incorrigibility proceedings
create a conflict of interest between parent and child has not led to
the repeal of beyond-control statutes. But questions have been raised
about the appropriateness of the behavioral standards which such laws
enforce. Professor Gough has pointed out that the law traditionally
views incorrigibility cases in terms of -the gap between the child's behavior and the parent's standards, 'and merely assumes that 'the parent's
96. 352 Mass. 564, 227 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
97. E.g., White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959) (held that failure of father to prosecute appeal as "next friend" was not binding on the child
in a tort action where the interests of father and child conflicted).
98. 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
99. The charge was brought one month before the daughter became eighteen, the
statutory limit in such cases.
100. 97 A.2d at 457.
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standards are the same as those of society.' 0 ' These same assumptions are reflected in the voluntary juvenile commitment system. In

beyond-control cases, Gough suggests that "[wihere the behavior of
the child diverges from the standards of the family, but does

not clearly threaten the community norms, it can be said to fall within
minimally acceptable, though not necessarily desirable, limits and
should not afford the court coercive jurisdiction."'

2

Gough further suggests that beyond-control cases present an ap.
propriate area for the application of the developing doctrine of the
right to treatment, 03 and that it should run to both parents and chil-

dren.

This doctrine, which had its origins in the area of civil com-

mitments, essentially holds that persons detained against their will on

purportedly therapeutic grounds must be given effective treatment or

released. 0 4 But the right -to treatment does not necessarily imply a
duty 'to submit to treatment. 0 5 We are beginning to see the first hints

of a corollary right which might be called the right to refuse treatment.'0 If, as Gough argues, the right to treatment should run to
both the parent and child where the person detained is a minor should
the right to refuse treatment also be exercisable by both? Judicial

recognition of the child's right to refuse treatment might be based
upon due process, as is the right to treatment,10° and upon the devel101. Gough, supra note 92, at 187.
102. Id. at 187-88.
While the state has taken the parents' side on the parental discipline issue by enacting and enforcing incorrigibility laws, it has also placed limits on the means which
parents can use-the child abuse statutes. Such laws typically measure child abuse in
terms of the injury, danger, or suffering inflicted upon the child, and provide stiff criminal penalties for parents who have overstepped the bounds of "acceptable" disciplining
of children. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273(a), 273(d). In contrast, child neglect
and dependency laws usually empower the juvenile court to remove the child from the
home, but stop short of criminal penalties for the parents. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 600. It has been argued that the key difference between child abuse and neglect is the element of deliberateness. S. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAiL:
RESPONSE TO FAmILY BREAKDOWN 22 (1971).

THE LAW'S

103. Id. at 194.
104. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
105. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 755, 762 (1969).
106. Relying on various constitutional grounds, courts have upheld a right to refuse treatment in a number of recent cases. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1973) (experimental drugs); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (tranquilizing medication); Stowers v. Ardmore Acres
Hosp., 19 Mich. App. 115, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969) (involuntary hospitalization); New
York City Health and Hospitals Corp. v. Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(electroshock treatment); Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health of Mich., Civ. No. 7319434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973) reported in 5 CLEAINo'HOUSE REv. 302-03 (Sept. 1973) (psychosurgery).

107.

Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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oping constitutional right to privacy."' 8 If the basis is due process,
the adversary nature of the parent's and child's interests would prevent the parent from constitutionally exercising the child's right. The
privacy doctrine has not been developed as fully, but the Supreme
Court has made clear that it is essentially an individual right,1" 9 and
therefore its exercise by a parent in opposition to the wishes of the
child, or the granting of a parental veto over the child's ability to exercise it, would contradict the spirit of a privacy based right to refuse
treatment. Gough has identified the key question by asking, "Has the
parent a right distinctly and separately cognizable from the right of
the child?"' 10 In juvenile voluntary commitments, no less than in
beyond-control cases, courts are faced with problems of family conflict and disruption presented by parents and children who have opposing legal interests.-"
C.

Patholgy in the Family

Often -the problems which lead parents to seek hospitalization of
their child can be traced to family difficulties and not just the "illness"
of an individual child." 2 A number of psychiatrists and other mental
health professionals now treat troubled families as units,"' and theorists have developed a number of concepts -to explain the forces at
work when family cohesiveness breaks down so dramatically that parents seek to commit their children to mental hospitals." 4
1.

Scapegoating

It has been observed that some parents transmit their own inadequacies -and conflicts to the weakest child in the family, and thus in108. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
109. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
110. Gough, supra note 92, at 187.
111. "To assume that the family's and patient's interests are always, or nearly always, compatible is to ignore the realities of family strife. At times it is one's family
against which one needs the most protection." N. KYr=E, supra note 4, at 86.
112. T. Liz, supra note 63.
113.

GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, TREATMENT OF FAMILs

IN

CONFLIcT (1970).
114. These concepts are usually found in studies which purport to explain the
causes of mental disorder, in particular, schizophrenia. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss the relative merits of the various theories regarding the etiology of
schizophrenia. The empirical studies conducted by adherents of the theory that schizophrenia originates within the structure of the patient's family present useful data for
an understanding of the processes of such families, whatever their etiological value.
The purpose of discussing them briefly here is solely to examine the situation within
the family which immediately precedes commitment.
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duce that child to live the role of one who is mentally ill.11 Some
indication of the prevalence of scapegoating is presented by a Philadelphia prehospitalization study which showed that in 25 percent of the
complaints of alleged mental illness, it was the complainant, rather
than the prospective patient, who evidence signs of mental illness."'
It is even theorized that in some families, when the scapegoated member's induced deviance becomes so pronounced that he or she must
be hospitalized, the family process creates a new scapegoat, and another family member takes up the deviant role.117 Clearly the existence of scapegoating in a family will mean that isolated treatment of
the child will not solve the problem; the pressures -to act deviantly will
continue with any family contact, and may resume in full force if the
patient returns to the family setting after discharge. The focus of
therapy must be on the family situation. In some cases acceding to
the parent's request for commitment of the child may only reinforce
the scapegoating mechanism and confirm to the child that his or her
1 18
deviant behavior is a result of personal inadequacy.
2.

Pseudo-Mutuality

Another key concept is pseudo-mutuality,"0 the development of
a veneer of intense affection accompanying interactions between family members which masks the true feelings persons in the family have
for one another. Pseudo-mutuality may be accompanied by a faulty
communication system within the family, which confuses messages be115. Vogel & Bell, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat, in
A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 412-427 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds. rev. ed.
1968).
Eric Bermann, an authority on family interaction, has documented one such case:
as the father of an eight-year-old boy lay dying, the family unconsciously selected the
boy as the "expendable" family member who was to serve as a scapegoat. The family
was unable to deal openly with the collective guilt and terror caused by the father's
illness, and instead projected those feelings into the behavior of the child. E. BnRMANN, SCAPEGOAT: THE IMPACT OF DEATH-FEAx ON AN AMERICAN FAMILY (1973).
116. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 171 (1966).
117. N. ACKERMAN, TREATING THE TROUBLED FAMILY 85 (1966); ci. Jackson

&

Yalom, Conjoint Family Therapy as an Aid to Intensive Psychotherapy, in THERAPY,
COMMUNICATION, AND CHANGE 169, 170 (D. Jackson ed. 1968); T. Lmz, supra note 63,
at 236-61. A growing field within child psychiatry is beginning to examine what makes
some children more vulnerable than others.

THE CHILD IN His FAMILY: CIILDREN AT

PsYcmAATRIc RISK (E.J. Anthony & C. Koupernik eds. 1974).
118. Recognition of family pathology and the parental role in dysfunctional families has led some courts to require family therapy in cases of child abuse. See, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY (C.H. Kempe & R. Hefer eds. 1972); Steele
& Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children, in
THE BATT-ERED CHILD 103-47 (R. Heifer & C.H. Kempe eds. 1968).
119. Wynne, Ryckoff, Day & Hirsch, Pseudo-Mutuality in the Family Relations
of Schizophrenics, 21 PSYcHIATRY 205 (1958),
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tween family members and thus inhibits the working out of internal

problems. 120 These circumstances can make it difficult for an outsider
to assess the family situation.

It may be difficult to perceive the tur-

bulent family dynamics if the presentation by family members gives
evidence of nothing by sweetness, light, and good feeling all around.
Whether the misinformation and inadequate intrafamily communica-

tion are based upon pathology in other family members or in the dynamics of the group process itself, the result is the same-a family

situation in which it is impossible for an "insider" to objectively decide
whether another family member requires hospitalization.
3.

Treatment and the Family

Whatever the cause of the disruption, 121 the difficulties of the
child often cannot be differentiated from the disorder within the family. 122 Szasz suggests that mental illness is often merely a label to
describe a person's failure to fulfill certain family obligations and ex-

pectations.

He argues that the decision whether to commit a person

is less a matter of medical treatment than it is a moral choice between

competing values--"the integrity of the family or the autonomy of -the
individual."' 2 3

In the case of voluntary juvenile commitments, the

law distorts the choice between family integrity and personal auton120. The classic case of such a confusing message is the "double bind." See, T.
LIDZ, supra note 63, at 171-78. Social psychologists have found that even in a nonfamily group situation, such faulty communication can lead to the expulsion of a deviant group member. Lemert, Paranoiaand the Dynamics of Exclusion, 25 SOCIOMPETRY
2 (March 1962).
121. It is at least theoretically possible that those who ascribe individual mental
disease to family pathology may have the causation reversed; the disruption in the family may be caused, in whole or in part, by the disruptive presence of the mentally ill
child in the family. An eminent psychoanalyst has observed:
We distort the situation if we abstract it in such a way that we consider the
parent as "having" such and such a personality when the child is born and
then, remaining static, impinging upon a poor little thing. For this weak and
changing little being moves the whole family along. Babies control and
bring up their families as much as they are controlled by them; in fact, we
may say that the family brings up a baby by being brought up by him.
E. ERiKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SocmTv 69 (2d ed. 1963). Erikson views biological factors as "potentialities for changing patterns of mutual regulation." Id.
The child's power within the family continues into the treatment process, whatever
the etiology of the problem may have been. This Comment focuses on the power of
the parents, since it is parental authority which is enforced by the state. But attorneys involved in juvenile commitment cases should be aware that the child may also
have a great deal of psychological power within the family. Probably the strongest
weapon in the child's arsenal is the ability to make the parents feel guilty. See generally B. BURSTEN,THE

MANIPULATOR:

A PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEw (1973).

122. It has been observed that symptoms are neither normal nor abnormal in and
of themselves; they derive their clinical importance from the situation in which they
occur. T. SCHEiFF, supra note 116, at 172.
123. T. SzAsz, supra note 30, at 154 (emphasis omitted).
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omy, for it bases its choice on the perception of the family situation
held by one part of the family-the parents. R.D. Laing has written,
"We can never assume that the people in the situation know what the
situation is. A corollary to this is: the situation has to be dis'
covered."124
In the case of juveniles, the law's method of discovery
is, in effect, a conclusive presumption that the parents' perception is
correct. The greatest drawback accompanying this presumption is that
parents often cannot assess their own role in family problems. If the
child in a family is disturbed, the parents may be the disturbing
agents.

12 5

Even from the perspective which views the family as the most
effective unit of treatment, the commitment of children by parents is
not always without therapeutic value. Parental consent to hospitalization may be a step toward involving parents in a treatment program
for the child and the family, and may have a positive impact on the
child's own approach to therapy.1 26 But recognition of the therapeutic
importance of the parents' agreement to, and participation in, the
-treatment of a disturbed child need not compel acceptance of the omnipotent role which the law currently gives to parents in deciding
whether to hospitalize the child. Parental involvement can-and
should-be obtained by means short of giving the parent absolute discretion. And in many cases, giving the parents such discretion may
have the effect of allowing the parents to withdraw from the troubled
situation by using the child's exclusion from the family as a means of
denying their own contribution to -the problem and not recognizing the
need for change on the part of all family members.' 27
D. An AppropriateRole for Parentsin the Commitment Process
What should be the parents' role in a new legal framework for
the hospitalization of mentally ill children? The first parental function
124. R.D. LAING, Intervention in Social Situations, in THm POLITICS OF TM FAM33 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
125. "There is no systematic psychoanalytic theory of the nature of transpersonal
defences, whereby self attempts to regulate the inner life of the other in order to preserve his own, nor of techniques of coping with such persecution by others." Id. at
13. Psychiatry's failure in this regard is evidenced by the fact that there are "clinical
terms for disturbed, but not for disturbing persons." R.D. LAINo & A. ESTERSON, SANrTY,MADNESs AND THE FAMILY 149 (1964).
126. Letter from Elizabeth Strutzel, supra note 61.
127. Some families not only postpone recognition of the problems faced by the
family until the intensity of family distress becomes unbearable, but also continue some
pretense of denial even after a member has been hospitalized. This has been observed
in families whose equilibrium depends upon the balancing influence provided by the
"sick" member's illness. T. Linz, supra note 63, at 274.
One group of commentators has noted that it is often a shift in the family equiILY AND OTHER ESSAYS
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will continue to be diagnostic. Parents (and to a certain extent schoolteachers) will be the persons most likely -to observe disturbed behavior
at an early stage, and will continue to be the persons most likely to
refer the child for professional diagnosis and treatment. 128 However,
the advantage of proximity to the child does not necessarily give parents the expertise or objectivity required to make a determination of
the precise nature of the problem or to decide whether hospitalization
is a necessary or desirable response. Thus the parent may remain
the initiator of the inquiry into the child's situation, but should not
retain the power to conduct -that inquiry alone or to decide on ,the
final disposition.
A second parental function may, in some cases, include personal
involvement in the treatment process. This may take the form of individual counseling or therapy for one or both parents, work with a
psychiatric social worker, conjoint family therapy in olvmg both the
child and .the parents, or a combination of these and other treatment
approaches. Depending upon the kind of treatment which the child,
and perhaps other family members, -are to undergo, parents may also
be asked or required to contribute financially to the cost of the hospitalization.' 2 9 Depending upon the child's age and the family situation at the time of his or her release from the hospital, the family
may also be called upon to take the child back into the home when
treatment is completed. But none of these admittedly important functions requires that parents decide whether the child should be hospitalized. They are often ill-equipped to make that decision by themselves. A legal framework must be devised which will infuse expertise and objectivity into a function which the parents now exercise
alone.

Iv
THE PSYCHIATRIST: A CHECK ON PARENTAL DIsCRETION?
It is often argued that even if the parent's authority to commit
children to mental hospitals is excessive, the admitting psychiatristf' 0
librium which necessitates hospitalization of a family member--either because it renders
that member more disturbed, or because the family can no longer provide care-rather
than a fundamental change in his or her medical condition. Id.
128. The parents' role in diagnosis has been exaggerated by some who claim that
it is exclusive. For example, the argument of counsel in Van Deusen v. Newcomer,
40 Mich. 90, 102 (1879), was that, "The disease is often so obscure and subtle as to
be detected only by the near relatives; those who discover differences in the patient
not open to the observation of a stranger or a casual acquaintance."
129. Even where minors can be admitted on their own application, hospitals may
require that the parents assume financial responsibility. V. VICTOROFF & H. Ross,
HosPrrALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL IN OHIO 49 (1969).
130. For the purposes of this paper, unless otherwise stated, the term "psychia-
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will act as a check -against ill-advised parental action. No figures are
available to indicate how frequently psychiatrists deny parental requests for the commitment of children on the grounds that the request
is inappropriate. Experience shows that in the most blatant cases of
parental error psychiatrists do screen out admissions which are not
warranted by apparent pathology in the child.' 31 In less obvious cases,
however, psychiatrists may fail to perform an effective screening function. There are three reasons for this failure: (1) The performance
of psychiatrists in precommitment interviews ,and examinations is often
perfunctory and tends toward overdiagnosis; (2) Psychiatrists may be
insensitive to legally important commitment issues; (3) The effectiveness of the psychiatrist in the admitting process is weakened by uncertainty over whose agent he or she is in such circumstances-the
parent's or the child's.
A.

PsychiatricInexactitude, Overdiagnosis,and
PerfunctoryPerformance

After a thorough study of the processes by which persons are
committed to mental hospitals, Professor Cohen concluded:
Civil commitment proceedings are . . characterized by mutual expectations of perfunctory performance. No pressure for the alteration of role and function is exerted from the formal participants-the
judge, the attorney, the psychiatrist, or the proposed patient. All
seem content to go through the empty ritual of the hearing and resist
any temptation to indulge in self-evaluation.Y 2
It is difficult -to generalize about the intensity of the precommitment
psychiatric investigation, 18 8 but in hospitals with inadequate professional staffing the process may involve only a short interview with the
parents and perhaps with the child. Few institutions can afford to
conduct a detailed investigation of the family background or the results
of previous attempts at treatment."8 4 Thus, in many cases, even with
trist" shall be used generally to refer to all professional personnel-including psychologists, psychiatric social workers, psychiatric nurses, etc.-who may have some responsibility for screening commitments to mental hospitals. While the differences between
the functions of these professionals are important, they are beyond the scope of this
paper. See, Comment, UnderprivilegedCommunications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. Rnv.
1050 (1973).
131. The author's experience suggests that the level of scrutiny given to these parental requests varies from psychiatrist to psychiatrist and from institution to institution.
132. Cohen, supranote 29, at 448.
133. Mishler & Waxler, Decision Processes in Psychiatric Hospitalization, 28 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 576 (1963).
134. See, e.g., B. ENNIS &L. SIEGEL, supra note 35, at 28.
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the best of motives, the psychiatrist will be contributing to a momentous decision on the basis of incomplete information.
There are other factors which may lead psychiatrists to conclude
incorrectly that a child or adolescent requires hospitalization. 13- 5
Thomas Scheff believes that overdiagnosis is a pattern which reflects
a value judgment within the medical profession that it is better -to err
on the side of caution, assuming disease rather than health. Scheff
notes that while this will not usually cause irreversible harm in cases
of assumed physical illness, it will result in deprivation of liberty where
mental illness is overdiagnosed. 136 One commentator has observed
that caution can further distort the diagnostic function when it is accompanied by a gloss of professional certainty, which leads doctors to
assume an "apostolic function," and to manipulate the patient so that
he or she manifests the disease which the doctor has diagnosed. 137 It
overdiagnosis may be
has also been noted that tendencies toward
1 8
child.
a
is
patient
the
when
pronounced
most
Dr. David L. Rosenhan recently conducted an experiment in
which eight normal persons, "pseudopatients," presented themselves
for voluntary admission at twelve different hospitals."3 9 The only
symptom the pseudopatients pretended to exhibit was hearing voices
saying something like "empty" or "thud."' 40 In every case, the pseudopatient was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or manic-depressive psychosis. Of particular interest is a follow-up experiment in which staff members at a research and teaching
hospital were told to be watchful for possible pseudopatients presenting themselves for admission. Of the 193 patients evaluated, 41 were
identified, with a high degree of confidence, as pseudopatients by at
least one staff member, and 23 were so identified by at least one psychiatrist. In fact, there were no pseudopatients in the group of 193.
Rosenhan concludes ,that "any diagnostic process that lends itself so
readily to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very reliable one."' 41
Overdiagnosis is not necessarily indicative of any lack of integrity
in the psychiatric profession. It may be a function of the caution
which is an essential part of medical training.' 42 It may also reflect
135. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974) (this issue).
136. T. SCHEFF, supra note 116, at 105-21.
137. M. BALINT, THE DocToR, His PATIENT, AND THE ILLNESS 216 (1957), cited
in T. ScHEFF, supra note 116, at 178.
138. T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 35 (1970).
139. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SciENcE 250 (1973) (reprinted in 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 379 (1973)).
140. Id. at 252.
141. Id. at 252.
142. Id.
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a desire to avoid any possibility of self-destructive behavior on the part
of the child being examined. 143 But whatever its sources, overdiagnosis leads not just to inaccuracies but to the wrongful confinement
of those young people whose situations do not require hospitalization.
Because psychiatric knowledge about functional mental disorders is
"clinical and intuitive, and thus not subject to verification by scientific methods,"'1 44 it should not be surprising that diagnosis is less than
precise. This inevitable imprecision lends support to the conclusion
that the liberty of children accused of mental illness by their parents
should not rest in the hands of psychiatrists alone.
B.

PsychiatricAttitudes Toward Legal Aspects of Commitment

An indication of the attitude of the psychiatric profession toward
legal safeguards in commitment cases may be found in Henry Davidson's popular text FoRENSIC PSYCHIATRY, 145 which argues that procedural safeguards developed in the criminal law to guarantee due process are inappropriate for use in involuntary commitment proceedings
of mental patients. Davidson views the medical considerations as fundamental, and as incompatible with various procedural requirements.
He argues that we cannot have it both ways; either we treat commitment as a medical problem, and do away with such features as notice
to the patient, or we treat it as a legal problem and subject the patient
to procedures which may be against his or her best medical interests.1 46 Dr. Davidson's views on notice requirements may reflect the
uneasiness with which some psychiatrists view the necessity of confronting the patient with the reality of confinement:
To psychiatrists, perhaps the most infuriating of the legal features of commitment is the requirement that notice be given to the
patient. .

.

. If the patient is already in a hospital on a temporary,

voluntary, or emergency paper, the ward physician has the unen143. See generally R. SEiDEN, SUicIDE AMONG YOUTH (1969) (U.S. Public Health
Service Publication No. 1971). Psychiatrists may similarly overpredict dangerousness
to others when examining mental patients, but the problem is most acute in the difficult to define area of "dangerousness to oneself." Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower
in Civil Commitment, 2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 43 (Feb. 1969). Professor Dershowitz
cites numerous examples to show how hard it is to define the precise meaning of danger to oneself, including the following limerick:
The Lament of a Coronary Patient
My doctor has made a prognosis
That intercourse fosters thrombosis
But I'd rather expire
Fulfilling desire

Than abstain, and develop neurosis.
Id. at 46.
144. T. Sc-sFF, supra note 116, at 7.
145. H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1965).
146. Id. at 282.
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viable task-in many states-of facing the patient and telling him
that steps have been initiated to declare him "insane."1 47

There is certainly little appreciation in the statement just quoted for
the role of -the patient in the making of the commitment decision,
much less the therapeutic importance of dealing with the prospective
patient honestly. Such attitudes toward legal requirements may be

stated in a more sympathetic fashion, 14 8 but however they are ex-

pressed, 4 ' the sentiments suggest that psychiatrists, even with the best
of good will, are ill equipped to play the judge's role in the commit-

ment of an unwilling juvenile. 50° In the case of adult commitments,
the law has devised machinery by which both concerns-medical and
legal-can be expressed in the decision making process. In the case

of juvenile commitments, if non-medical considerations are to be taken
into account, at present it must be done sua sponte by the admitting
physician. This double burden is one that psychiatrists should not be
required to shoulder. 151
C.

The Psychiatristas Double Agent' 52

The traditional position of the psychiatric profession is that the
psychiatrist is the agent of the patient, and will act only on his or her
behalf. When a parent seeking to have a child committed goes to
a hospital official or a private psychiatrist, however, the psychiatrist's
position becomes less clear-cut. In the case of a juvenile voluntary
147. Id. at 229-30. This uneasiness may in turn encourage practices by which
minors are lured into hospitals under a veil of parental lies ("It's only for some tests").
148. E.g., a leading text on psychiatry contains this description of the relationship
between lawyer and psychiatrists:
One of the important differences between the psychiatrist and the lawyer is in
their respective attitudes toward the admission of the mentally ill person to a
hospital. The psychiatrist urges that the dignity of the patient be respected
and that the obstacles to his admission be no greater than those experienced
by the physically sick person. . . . T]he law insists on a punctilious observance of what it regards as human rights. . . . The lawyer should not be criticized too severely for his vigilant solicitude for the legal rights of the individual. The physician believes, however, that one's medical rights are no less
fundamental than his legal rights, and that the sick person should not be subjected to heartless and harmful mental torture incident to commitment.
L. KOLB, NoYEs' MODERN CLINIcAL PsYcHIATRY 606 (7th ed. 1968).
149. Psychiatrists may also express their lack of concern for non-medical considerations by simply ignoring the subject. T. SZASZ, supra note 30, at 41.
150. Dershowitz, supra note 143, at 47.
151. Oran, Judges and Psychiatrists Lock Up Too Many People, 7 PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY 20, 27 (Aug. 1973). Cf. Cohen, supranote 29, at 456.
A more adversary proceeding would also provide a challenge to commitment examinations and the tendency to overdiagnose. See text accompanying notes 132-44 supra.
152. The concept of the psychiatrist as a double agent (where the bind is between
the patient and the state) is discussed in S. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 119-

25 (1971).
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patient, the -legal volition involved is that of the parent. While the
goal of the psychiatrist will be expressed-and perceived-as the best
welfare of the child-patient, it is the parent who has come to seek
help, whose situation seems most desperate, who seems the most reliable source of information about what is wrong, who is closest to the
psychiatrist in age and social outlook,18 and who is paying the psychiatrist's fee. Sociologist Thomas Scheff reports an interview with
one committing physician who observed: "[The family request cases
are] pretty automatic. If the patient's own family wants to get rid
of him you know there is something wrong."154 It is not clear how
many psychiatrists hold such a view, but even where the physician does
a more independent evaluation, it may be difficult to disentangle the
problems of the individual child from the context of the family setting.
Whenever it arises, overidentification with the parent ill equips
the psychiatrist to function as a check on the desire of the parent to
hospitalize the child. The effect may ,bethat the admitting or certifying psychiatrist becomes--often unwittingly-the agent of the parent
in the parent-child confrontation.
D. Early Discharge,An InadequateRemedy for
Improvident Commitment
It is sometimes argued that even if the psychiatrist is ineffective
as a check on parents seeking commitment, any error will be rectified
by hospital personnel who will quickly recognize and release a child
who does not require hospitalization. This argument fails to take into
account the realities of institutional practice. The impersonal nature
of day-to-day hospital operation makes immediate identification unlikely. The hospital staff nay not be oriented toward recognizing the
absence of pathology. 5 ' And even if the child is released soon after
admission, it cannot be said that no harm has been done.
1.

InstitutionalConsiderations

Institutional contingencies which play an important part in determining whether a patient is released range from the number of beds
available in the hospital to policy regarding release of the marginally
ill. Some hospitals have an unofficial policy of retaining patients
153. A recent study by a noted political scientist found that nearly two-thirds of
the public hospital psychiatrists surveyed believe that the typical American family is
too lenient with children. A. RoGow, THE PsYcmHAmisTs 185 (1970).
154. T. ScHmFF, supra note 116, at 147. Scheff describes another psychiatrist who
recommended a thirty day commitment for a patient whom he thought not to be mentally ill. The young patient was having difficulties with his parents, and the doctor
felt he "might get into trouble." Id.
155. Rosenhan, supra note 139.

VOLUNTEERING CHILDREN

1974]

whose medical condition might merit release until someone in the
community expresses willingness 'to take responsibility for them." 6 In
cases of very young and very old patients, "community acceptance"
often means the willingness of the patient's family to take him or her
into the family home. Since voluntary juvenile patients are often committed precisely because the family feels that they cannot live together,
pressure will be felt by the institution to keep, rather than release,
such patients during the period immediately following hospitalization.
Another reason why hospital staffs may not be successful in sorting out patients who do not need to be institutionalized is that institutionalization itself may induce aberrant behavior, thus reinforcing the
admitting psychiatrist's original judgment that the patient needs hospitalization. The normal response to the bizarre surroundings and depersonalized atmosphere of such institutions has been aptly termed a
process of "mortification."'15 7 Scheff suggests that hospitalized patients
are "rewarded for playing the stereotyped deviant role."' 58 He asserts
that every doctor has a vague but firm notion of how a patient
ought to behave when ill, and that patients respond to this expectation."" The patient's own mental disorganization may contribute to
adoption of the expected deviant role: "It can be argued that when
a person is in a confused and suggestible state, when he organizes
his feelings and behavior by using the sick role, and when his choice
of roles is validated by a physician or others, he is 'hooked' and will
proceed on a career of chronic illness."'60 Since the patient is constantly receiving cues from the expectations of the staff and the behavior of other patients, the product may be behavior which is not
readily distinguishable from other patients.
Day-to-day realities of the manner in which patients and staff interact on a hospital ward may not be conducive to an objective appraisal of the mental state of a patient who is protesting his or her
confinement; indeed, strenuous requests for discharge may themselves
be viewed as signs of pathology. Dr. Szasz has noted, "The relationship between physicians and patients in psychiatric hospitals is often
a struggle between adversaries; this fact requires legal recognition."'
In the case of juvenile voluntary commitments, the law has not made
that recognition.
156. T. ScrEFF, supra note 116, at 167.
157.

E.

GOFFmAN,

The Moral Career of the Mental Patient, in ASYLUMs 117-55

(1961).
158.

T. SCHEFF, supra note 116, at 84.

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 84-87.
Id. at 121.
T. SzAsZ, supra note 30, at 181.
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Labelling

Even if a child were to be released at an early date, damage may
have been done to the child by the experience of hospitalization. Hospitalization is the surest way of attaching the label of "crazy" or "mentally ill" to a person, and such a label carries with it the adverse reaction of other people who find out about the hospitalization in a person's past. The "crazy" label can also have a powerful impact upon
the self-concept of the person institutionalized, especially where that
person is young and impressionable. Scheff argues that this kind of
labelling is the single most important cause of "careers of residual deviance." The act of labelling reverses the presumption of normality
which is usually accorded a person's actions. Since the presumption
of abnormality attaches to the "former mental patient," the amount
of deviance in his or her behavior will be exaggerated in the perceptions of others, ,and perhaps in fact.162 Oddities of behavior which
would not be noticed in a "normal" person will be seen as proof of
continued craziness in a former mental patient. Craziness will be
found in these actions, and the label will be renewed and confirmed.
Psychiatric labels, once attached, gain a life of their own, and even
when the person no longer exhibits any manifestations of mental disease, his illness is considered to be "in remission." The remission
label carries with it the connotation that -the person will at some time
begin to behave in a crazy manner again. Thus the discharged patient, his relatives, and his friends gain the expectation that the illness
will recur, and this expectation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in
many cases;1 63 such a label may be a primary cause of the situation
which it purports to describe.""
E. A Role for the Independent Psychiatrist

One alternative would be to provide an independent psychiatrist
for the child at all commitment proceedings. The independent psychiatrist can avoid the pitfalls discussed above, by functioning as a part
of a legal process, and in conjunction with the child's counsel. Thus,
while the psychiatrist in a model juvenile commitment system would
remain vitally important as the source of expert knowledge concerning the child's problems, psychiatric expertise would be only one of
several inputs into a judicial determination of the wisdom of the proposed commitment.
162.
163.
164.

T. SCHEFF, supranote 116, at 154.
Rosenhan, supra note 139, at 253-54.
R.D. LAiNG, supra note 124, at 41-42.

1974]

VOLUNTEERING CHILDREN
V.

THE CHILD: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW ROLE
The present "voluntary admissions" system gives parents almost
total discretion to commit their children, subject only to the check of
the admitting physician. The child's role is limited -to influencing, by
argument or behavior, the parents and doctor. A central thesis of this
Article is that the child's role in commitment proceedings can and
should be expanded. One must first accept either as a matter of constitutional law or as an article of secular faith, the idea that children
are persons and that as persons they have a right to be heard in matters which significantly affect their lives. These assumptions underlie
this Article. Hospitalization-because it deprives children of liberty and because it leaves psychological wounds which in some cases
never heal-so vitally affects the lives of children that the law is obligated to solicit and consider their opinions before allowing them to
be committed.
A.
1.

The ConstitutionalFramewdrk

Children,Parents,and the State

The delineation of children's rights by the United States Supreme
Court is still in nascent condition. Early cases involving children were
generally viewed as controversies between parental authority and the
authority of the state, the rights of children often receiving only a fleeting reference. In Meyer v. Nebraska,'6" the Court noted in passing
that the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment includes the
right to "acquire useful knowledge."' 6 6 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1 67 after noting the contention 'that the enactment conflicted with
"the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school,"',"
ithe Court rested its decision on the interference with the authority of
parents and guardians to direct the unbringing and education of their
165. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (reversing the .conviction of a teacher by using the substantive due process doctrine of that era). For a brief abstract of the case, see text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. See discussion of parents' rights accompanying notes 64111 supra.
166. Id. at 399. This remark probably referred to the rights of the pupils to
learn. It could, however, have been meant to buttress the rights of the teacher. It
follows a reference to occupational interests, and might be read to highlight the right
of a teacher to put acquired knowledge to use in teaching. The Court seems to have
accepted the former interpretation. Justice Rutledge wrote in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944), that "children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than
the nation's common tongue" had been guarded in Meyer. Id. at 166. See also Tinker
v. Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (Meyer said to
have protected the liberty of teacher, student, and parents).
167. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
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children, and the rights of the private school to engage in business
09
free from unreasonable interference with its patrons.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'7" the
Court seems to have recognized that children are entitled to first

amendment protections. 171 The plaintiffs won an injunction against
the expulsion of children who would not salute the flag, and against
72

prosecution of parents and guardians for aiding in their delinquency.1
One year later, in Prince v. Massachusetts,7 8 the Court explicitly dis-

tinguished between the claims of parents and children.174 In Prince
the guardian of a 9-year-old child was convicted of violating state child
labor laws by furnishing a child with magazines, knowing that the child
would sell them unlawfully, and by permitting a child in her custody
to "work" contrary to law.' 75 The guardian and child were Jehovah's
Witnesses and had been distributing copies of Watchtower and Conso-

lation, engaging in what they considered to be a religious duty.17 0 The
Court acknowledged that two claims were at stake: the parent's right
to bring up the child, and the child's right to follow the tenets and
77

practices of their faith.1

Writing for the Court, Justice Rutledge proceeded to characterize

the state's assertion of authority as representing "the interest of society
to protect the welfare of children,' ' 78 and analyzed the case by con168. Id. at 532.
169. Id. at 534-36. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 15 (1944), Justice Rutledge described the Court's action in Pierce as sustaining both "the parent's authority
to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it ...
"
Id. at 166.
170. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
171. The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether
a ceremony so touching matters of public opinion and political attitude may
be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed
to any political organization under our Constitution.
Id. at 636.
Neither our domestic tranquility in peace nor our martial effort in war
depend on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony which ends
in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual condemnation.
Id. at 644 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). But cf. Justice Frankfurter's statement
in dissent:
And the question here is whether the state may make certain requirements that seem to it desirable or important for the proper education of -those
future citizens who go to schools maintained by the states, or whether the pupils in those schools may be relieved from those requirements if they run
counter to the consciences of their parents.
Id. at 657 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 629-30, 645.
173. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
174. Id. at 164.
175. Id. at 160.
176. Id. at 161-63.
177. Id. at 164.
178. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that
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sidering the constitutionality of the child labor law. He asserted that
the state's authority over children's activities was broader than over
those of adults,17 and that the regulation in question was not unreasonable.'8 0
In dissent, Justice Murphy accepted the tenet that the power of
the state to control the activities of chidlren was broader than its power
over adults,' 8 ' but reached a different result. He believed that the risk
of nonpersuasion was on the state to prove the "reasonableness and
necessity" of the prohibition.' 8 2 Justice Murphy concluded that the
state had failed to meet this stricter standard of review. Because a
restriction on religious acitivity was involved, Justice Murphy required
the state to justify the regulation and employed a more exacting rule
of law.
The majority in Ginzberg v. New York, 1 83 drew strength from
the holding of Prince. In Ginzberg, the Court sustained a state's use
of variable concepts of obscenity by which material which would not
be obscene for adults was obscene for those under eighteen.' 8 4 A
New York statute made unlawful the knowing sale to a person under
seventeen of magazines which contain pictures depicting nudity and
which are harmful to minors.18 5 In his amajority opinion, Justice Brennan explained 'that the legislature could properly conclude that the law
He -then aswould assist parents and teachers to care for minors. 18
serted a distinct societal interest in the well-being of its youth. 1 87 In
both regards he made reference to Prince. He found that the New
York legislature might rationally conclude that exposure to these matechildren be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growing
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance,
regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways.
Id. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
179. Id. at 168.
180. Justice Rutledge contrasts his analysis with one requiring the showing of a
clear and present danger. Id. at 167. Instead, he accepts the statutory classifications
of children and selling activities as appropriate. While he appears to begin a search
for justification of the regulation in the particular fact situation of the case, he short
circuits the analysis with a generalized assertion of "harmful possibilities" and eventually defers to the state's determination that an absolute prohibition is necessary to accomplish its objectives. Id. at 169-70.
181. Id. at 173.
182. Id.
183. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
184. Id. at 638.
185. Id. at 633.
186. Id. at 639.
187. Id. at 640.
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rials would be harmful to young people.18
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School

District,89 the conflict was again one between state regulation and
children's rights. The majority opinion of Justice Fortas left no doubt
that the children were exercising their first amendment rights of expression by wearing black armbands to school in protest against the
hostilities in Southeast Asia. 190 The Court recognized students as "persons under our Constitution," and failed to discount their complement
of rights. 191

While Tinker reaffirmed children's right to first amend-

ment protection vis a vis the state, it did so in a setting of family
solidarity; the protesting students -and their parents were in agreement. 192
It was not until Wisconsin v. Yoder, 98 that the prospect of children asserting first amendment rights in opposition to their parents'
wishes was raised, and even then, most vigorously in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Douglas. 94 Justice Douglas was quick to point out
that the compulsory education requirement in issue effected not only
the free exercise claims of Amish parents, but also those of their high
school children.' 9 5
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the
inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty
upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views. 1 0
188. Id. at 641-43. Since no argument was advanced that the magazines were not
harmful to minors, Justice Brennan recognized no issue concerning the obscenity of the
material. Id. at 635. Since obscenity is not "protected speech," Justice Brennan felt
justified in using this permissive rule of law. Id. at 641.
189. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
190. Id. at 507, 508.
191. Id. at 511.
But see the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart refers to both
Prince and Ginzberg, and quotes from his concurring opinion in Ginzberg:
A State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely determined areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees.
Id. at 515, quoting from 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968).
192. 393 U.S. at 504. Cf. id. at 516.
193. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
194. Id. at 241-46. See also id. at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 238
(White, J., concurring); id. at 230-32 (Burger, C.J., dictum).
195. Id. at 241.
196. Id. at 242.
One line of argument drawing strength from the first amendment cases of Tinker
and Barnette is that a child-like other persons-has a right to the integrity of his
or her own personality, and that until it can be shown that aberrant behavior is a pathological danger to the safety or peace of others and not merely a harmless expression
of individual style, parents have no right to coerce changes in that behavior. The no-

1974]

VOLUNTEERING

CHILDREN

Justice White accepted -the possibility that some Amish children
might abandon the Amish faith and way. 9T He recognized:
A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop
the latent talents of its children but also in seeking to prepare them
for the life style that they may later choose, or at least to provide
them with an option other than the life they have led in the past.198
But in the circumstances of this case, 99 he decided the close question
by concurring with the majority. Justice Stewart was more vehement
and read the record as not presenting a question of conflicting free
exercise claims.200
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that the state
could not compel these respondents to make their children attend formal high schools until age sixteen. 2 ' He noted that it was the parents
who were subject to prosecution, and that the holding "in no degree
depend[ed] on the assertion of the religious interest of the child as
contrasted with that of the parents. 2 0 2 Chief Justice Burger did proceed to intimate the view that recognition of a claim by the state on
the theory that parents were preventing their minor children from attending high school contrary to the children's wishes would have
brought into question traditional concepts of parental control over the
upbringing and education of their children. 03
These cases suggest several lessons. (1) Children are persons
and enjoy constitutional rights and protections. 20 4 (2) The children's
interests have generally been seen as allied with those of their parents.01
(3) In conflicts between tho interests of parents and children, the rights of children and the role of the state are still without
tion of a danger sufficient to justify the limitation of a child's expression of personality
is an adaptation of the first amendment rule of law commonly called clear and present
danger. Application of this exacting standard of justification goes beyond the intensity
with which the .ourts have generally been willing to review disputes 'between parents
and children.
197. Id. at 240.
198. Id.
199. Here the children did attend public schools through the eighth grade, and
there was no evidence that Amish children who did decide to leave would not be able
to acquire additional academic training and skills. Id. at 238, 240.
200. Id. at 237.
201. Id. at 234.
202. Id. at 230.
203. Id. at 230-34.
204. Tinker v. Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
205. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). But see text accompanying notes 195-96 supra.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:840

clear delineation.200 (4) The state may act to limit parents' discretion with regard to their child.20 7 When it does, its interest are twofold: a) protecting the interests of the child, and b) furthering a gen-

eral societal interest in the well-being of its youth.
2.

The Child and ProceduralDue Process

The Court has been vigorous in extending to children the procedural safeguards provided in the Bill of Right for those accused of

crimes.

Between 1966 and 1971, almost all the procedural safe-

guards of adult defendants were extended to children in delinquency
proceedings. In Kent v. United States,2 0 8 limits were placed upon the

power of juvenile courts to waive jursidiction, thereby sending the accused child to trial as an adult. The parental function of the juvenile

court judge, Justice Fortas noted, is "not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness."20 9 In re Gault 10 reinforced Fortas's warning by holding
that due process required notice of the charges, right to counsel, right
to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege

2
against self-incrimination in juvenile proceedings. In re Winship "1
added to the list of protections by holding that due process in juvenile
212
delinquency cases required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

With rare exception,213 the Court has held that children may not
be denied the procedural protections afforded adults. In so doing,

it has rejected "the assertion that a child, unlike an adult has a right
'not to liberty but to custody.' "24 Instead, the holdings of these cases
are consistent with an analysis which begins by assuming children are

entitled to full constitutional rights, and which proceeds to limit these
rights only when accommodation is required to resolve a conflict with

the interests of parents, society, or what appears to be the child's best
interest 2 1 5

206. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The next sections of this Comment will examine these questions and suggest a resolution of this problem in the setting of the voluntary commitment of children by their parents.
207. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Cf. Ginzberg v. New York,
390 U.S.629 (1968).
208. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
209. Id. at 555.
210. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
211. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
212. Id. at 368.
213. The Court failed to make this process complete when a plurality later held
that due process did not require trial by jury in juvenile courts, because of the allegedly
damaging effects on juvenile offenders and the functioning of juvenile courts. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
214. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
215. In one case, the Court used differences between children and adults as one
reason for extending the privilege against self-incrimination to juveniles: "[Aluthorita-
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B.
1.

An Expanded Role for the Child

JudicialReview of Parens Patriae and Patria Potestas

The configuration of interests in juvenile commitment proceedings is a closed -triangle; any expansion of the child's rights must be
accommodated on another side. The Court has been noticeably more
reticent in checking parental discretion than in limiting the power of
the state.21 6 One obvious reason why the courts have been willing
to maintain children's rights against the state but not against their parents is that parents could be expected to shake the political foundations over such rulings, whereas the state's interests are more abstract
and less likely -tobe expressed politically.
A second factor may be that in some situations under review, the
state's position vis a vis both parents and children has been weakened
by the conflicting dictates of the parens patriae doctrine. The two
relevant elements of this doctrine are (1) that the state in its role
as protector of the weak must sometimes protect children from their
parents, and (2) that in certain circumstances the state may require
both parents and children to act in such a way as to promote the societal interest. These two elements are in conflict where the aggressor
against the child is the state, itself. In this regard, the Gault and
Tinker decisions may be read to require a preference for the protectionist role of the state over the activist role.2 17
The voluntary commitment of children by their parents seems
closer to a traditional pdrens patriae situation in which the emphasis
is on protection. The axis of potential conflict is between children
and their parents. The parents initiate the commitment process by
volunteering their child. The state's power has up until now been
exercised or reserved in support of that parental choice. Instead, the
state could provide more effective safeguards so that the interests the
child perceives as his or her own will not go unrecognized in so vitally important a matter.
It may not be necessary to mount a direct attack against parental
control. While the courts might be uneasy about restricting parental
prerogatives, they may not be indifferent to the argument that the
state, in denying procedural safeguards to juveniles, now enforces
blanket discrimination against children. Under the current system, the
tive opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of 'confessions' by children." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967). See also Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
216. See discussion accompanying notes 193-207 and notes 208-215 supra.
217. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, pt. m, The Relation to The State, 5 FAM. L.Q. 64, 107 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Kleinfield Il].
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state automatically endorses the parents' view of the child's problems.
The state, through the courts, should instead take a more even-handed
approach and weigh the preferences and interests of both parents and

child before determining whether commitment is necessary. 218
2.

Conceptionsof Age and Responsibility
Legal perceptions of age and responsibility may be critical to any

attempt to change the present system of juvenile commitment. 21 The
setting of age limits for the enjoyment of legal rights seems peculiarly
a legislative function. Arguments about how old children must be before they can participate in their own commitment proceedings may
ultimately have to be decided by state legislatures.

The age limit cur-

rently in force for most purposes in most states is 21.
Suggestions for varying that limit with regard to some circumstances have been advanced. One proposal for the particular setting
under discussion was made in the National Institute of Mental Health's
Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill. It suggested
that 16 is the age at which persons should be able to seek voluntary
hospitalization on their own initiative, or, once hospitalized, seek their
own release. 22 0 The Act's Commentary argues for the lower age on

the basis of such factors as -the legal capacity of adolescents to consent
to surgery,2 2' and their legal responsibility for criminal acts-a matter
which varies from state to state.

These arguments have not proven

totally persuasive; some states which have adopted the Draft Act have
modified it to make the age of responsibility 21.222
Citing the works of Piaget and other authority, Justice Douglas argued for an even younger age of responsibility in his Yoder
dissent. 223 Noting that 14- and 15-year-olds are often permitted to
218. Judges may be more receptive to arguments emphasizing the law's developing
guarantees of children's rights than to allegations of irrationality or vindictiveness on
the part of parents seeking to commit their children. The role of the state is the preferred ground upon which to argue. It will be incumbent upon the children's rights
advocates to demonstrate that the state's failure to give children any voice in the matter of their own commitment is unreasonable. By asserting rights of expression and
due process, petitioners will be seeking a strict standard of judicial review. By characterizing the conflict along children-state lines, they will strengthen the possibility of
evoking a favorable rule of law.
219. Even if children's rights advocates succeed with arguments similar to those
advanced here, some differentiation among children on the basis of capacity or age may
still be essential. What is left to parental discretion when an infant is six months old
may no longer seem so compelling when the child becomes a teenager.
220. Draft Act (Commentary), supra note 17, at 19-20.
221. An assumption which appears to be erroneous, see text accompanying notes
81-84 supra.
222. Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient, 53 MICH. L. REv. 353,
360 (1955).
223. Justice Douglas cites:
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testify in custody proceedings, Douglas argued that the moral and intellectual maturity of children at age 14 is close to -that of an adult. 2 4
As Justice Douglas noted, an important area of judicial decisions
allowing choices to children is that of custody cases. It has been vigorously argued that the child's interest should be separately presented
to the court in custody cases, and that neither parent's attorney can
present the child's position in an objective form, although both will
argue that it is in the child's best interest that their client have custody.225 It has been observed that the child's right to be heard in
custody decisions derives from the "notion that a youth has certain inherent rights to free association, extending to the custodial relationships to which he is subject,"2 2 6 and also draws strength from analogy
to the rules of civil procedure dealing with compulsory joinder of par22 7
-tiesand intervention by right.
Either by statute or judicial decision, many states recognize that
the choice of a child of a certain age, usually between 10 and 14,
should be considered as a factor in awarding custody.2 2 This choice
will only be honored if -the parent chosen by the child meets the court's
standards of "fitness," and even then, in most jurisdictions, the child's
preference is treated "as simply another relevant factor."2 2 9 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act directs the judge to "give due weight
to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and is capable of
forming an intelligent preference," and to follow the preferences of
a child of 16 or over, unless "the child is so mentally or emotionally
disturbed as to be unable -to form an intelligent preference; '230 but
the drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners
J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1948); D. Elkind, Children
and Adolescents 75-80 (1970); Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A
Development View, in R. Muuss, Adolescent Behavior and Society 193, 199200 (1971); W. Kay, Moral Development 172-183 (1968); A. Gesell & F. Ilg,
Youth: The Years from Ten to Sixteen 175-182 (1956).
406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Inker & Perratta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MAss.
L.Q. 229, 235 (1970). See also CmLDREN IN THE CoupTs-THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION 21-143 (G. Newman ed. 1967).
226. Kleinfeld II, supra note 77, at 442.
227. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a), 24(a)(2), cited in Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power
Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, pt. I, The Representational Context, 4
FAM. L.Q. 320, 324-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kleinfield I].
228. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965).
229. C. FOOTE, R. Lvy & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 852
(1966). For some other factors which may be considered, see, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
230. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 4.9 (First Tentative Draft, Second Working Draft 1969).
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on Uniform State Laws rejected this proposal as too far-reaching.23 '
State laws tend to give more weight to a child's choice where
the child is not choosing between parents in a divorce. Courts are
less eager to grant the child's wishes where such a choice may disrupt
the relationships within an existing family. The situation of a minor
protesting against hospitalization sought by his or her parents is closely
analogous to custody choice during divorce; the family still exists but
has been broken by the parents' desire to have the child removed to
an institution. In a custody decision following divorce, the judge considers the child's preferences and objections along with other evidence
from other family members. The proposed expanded role of the child
in voluntary commitment proceedings would likewise have the judge
consider the child's point of view along with other evidence before
determining whether the child should be committed. Some commentators contend that adult choices can be entrusted to children from
about the age of 13 on asserting:
"[P]ersons generally reach -their adult levels of abstract intelligence
and moral development long before the termination of infancy, at
around puberty. For about the last eight years or so of infancy, a
person has about as much capacity to exercise choice as an adult, yet
'232
is denied adult liberty.
One interesting suggestion is that of Ennis and Siegel, who argue that
"anyone who is old enough to protest his hospitalization should have
the right to a court hearing to oppose hospitalization, whether his parents want him to have a hearing or not. '2 8 This4 proposal might make
23
unnecessary the setting of an arbitrary age limit.
In considering the proper extent of a child's participation in commitment proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the choices and
the responsibility required are not limitless. Even adults who seek
to contest their own commitment or who attempt to terminate their hospitalization are not given total discretion under the law. It is assumed
that mental illness may impair their capacity to make this choice; thus
231.

C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 148-

49 (Supp. 1971).
232.

Kleinfeld Ill, supra note 217, at 69 (footnote omitted).

233. B. ENis & L. SiEGEL, supra note 35, at 38-39.
234. Courts still may shy away from state action in situations where the controversy is between a parent and child. For example, in Kentera v. Boesel, 41 Cal. 2d
639, 262 P.2d 317 (1953), a California court refused to honor the request of at 14year-old boy that his grandmother be appointed his guardian. The boy was living with
his divorced mother and the court did not consider the appointment "necessary or convenient." Id. at 644-45, 262 P.2d at 320. The court explained that the statutory provisions allowing minors over the age of 14 the privilege of nominating their guardians
"were not intended to upset the normal relationship of parent and child or to disrupt
normal family discipline by allowing the 14-year-old minor to withdraw from the family circle at his whim." Id. at 643, 262 P.2d at 319.
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judicial review is provided as a check on their possibly ill-advised
choice. This check, in the form of a hearing before a judge, could
also protect against the possibly unwise objections of an adolescent.
Evaluating the proper role of the child in a new legal framework
for juvenile commitment decisions is difficult, partly because so little
legal thinking has been done regarding the law's relationship to children. 2 5 It should be clear that there is little justification for the present practice of giving the child no role at all. It is equally clear that
for children's rights to mean anything, access to effective counsel must
be provided at each stage at which the child's substantive rights are
at issue. But it is important in devising a new system of juvenile commitment procedures not to allow the wishes and .plight of the child
to get lost in the competing interests and efforts of his or her parents,
psychiatrist, and counsel. If the provision of counsel and a forum in
which to be heard merely bureaucratizes an assembly line process in
which children are automatically committed to hospitals, then the legal
process will be camouflaging a sham, and the wishes of the child will
remain an irrelevancy. Thus, the counsel and forum provided must
be truly effective.
VI
THE LAWYER:

PROVIDING EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Any attempt to reduce the power of parents and psychiatrists by
giving a voice -to children whose hosptialization is being sought will
necessarily depend on an enlarged role for counsel so that the children
may exercise their rights effectively.
Presently, lawyers play a negligible role in the juvenile commitment process. In some cases attorneys may be useful in negotiating
a juvenile's release from a -hospital,23 but this is a relatively rare occurence because, as a practical matter, few young patients have access
to counsel. The lawyer, if somehow retained, has little leverage since
in most jurisdictions legal remedies are simply not available to juvenile clients. "Only in jurisdictions requiring judicial or other independent hearings is counsel actually accorded an opportunity to function properly. Without the hearing, the counsel is like an actor without a stage."' 237

In order to understand the function counsel might

perform in a new system of juvenile commitments, it may be useful
235. Exceptions are the areas of estates, probate law, and juvenile delinquency.
Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their Parents and the State, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 320 (1970).
236. See, e.g. Oran, supra note 151, at 20.
237. N. KrrrIE, supra note 4, at 92.
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to examine the role of lawyers in related areas: the adult commitment

process and juvenile courts.
A.

1.

The Representationof Adult Mental Patients

The Role of Counsel

Even in adult commitment proceedings, the status of counsel varies widely from state to state. Forty-one states and the District of

Columbia provide for the appearance of counsel at commitment hearings, but appointment is mandatory in only about half of those jurisdictions.238

In almost every state where lawyers have been provided,

the right is based upon legislative policy rather than a juducial holding
that counsel is required by the Constitution.3 9 Thus, there has been
no blanket extension of the right to counsel to prospective mental patients in the manner that In re Gault extended the right to juvenile
delinquents and Argersinger v. Hamlin240 extended it to nonfelony de-

fendants subject to imprisonment. With regard to this gap in Supreme
Court decisions, Professor Kittrie argues that mental patients have
a greater need for an attorney's assistance than criminal defendants
because they are subject to "even more far-reaching interference with
their property rights," and more importantly because "they are less
likely than felons to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and

their consequences or to be able to represent their own interests."' 241

Inadequate legislation and a lack of favorable judicial decisions

are not the only reasons that mental patients received representation
inferior to that afforded criminal defendants. The attitudes and practices of the bar may reduce the value of counsel to a patient fortunate
enough to have a lawyer. One of the major reasons for poor representation of mental patients is the heavy caseload of public defenders242 and appointed counsel243 in many jurisdictions. Appointed at238. Cohen, supra note 29, at 437.
239. Id. For examples of cases holding that there is a constitutional requirement
of appointed counsel for indigent patients see In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Dixon v. Attorney General,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); People ex rel. Rodgers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256,
217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966). A summary of the constitutional arguments can be found in Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing
Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MIss. L.J. 43, 44-46
(1974).
240. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
241. N. Krrnun, supra note 4, at 91.
242. Prior to the adoption of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. AND
INSTN'S CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West 1972), in 1967, one California public defender testified that he handled 45 to 50 commitment cases per week, and that he produced witnesses infive percent of those cases or less. Testimony of Phillip Smith, California
Assembly Interim Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Mental Health, Public
Hearings, Los Angeles, December 20, 1965.
243. Cohen describes one appointed attorney in Travis County, Texas, who was
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torneys typically have little time to44prepare a defense, or even to interview the client prior to the hearing.

Even retained attorneys do not always provide the most vigorous
defense for their clients in civil commitment cases, either for lack of
expertise in the mental health area 245 or for lack of remuneration. 24 6
The lack of an adversary setting even for adult commitment proceedings
in many jurisdictions 247 may make attorneys uncertain about their
proper role. 248 Occasionally an attorney may feel that the client would
profit from hospitalization,24 9 or even fear that as the attorney, he or
she may be seen as responsible for violent or self-destructive acts the
25 0
client might commit if released into the community.
2.

Criticism of the Attorney

There are different appraisals of the potential effect of increasing
the lawyers' role in juvenile commitment proceedings.

In response

to a recent article calling for greater legal safeguards for those confronted with involuntary hospitalization, 251 one reader who agreed with
the indictment of the commitment process argued that the entry of
lawyers into the cast confronting the patient could only make things
worse and would be "akin to suggesting -that a Jewish Preservation
assigned forty cases, all to be heard in one day. The attorney did not interview any
of his clients prior to the hearings, and the only real functions he performed were to
see that statutory notice requirements had been met and to sign the jury waiver form.
Cohen, supra note 29, at 428-30.
244. Id. At least one court has held that failure of the attorney to interview his
or her client does not constitute a denial of due process, since the appointment of counsel is sufficient to create a presumption of regularity. Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa
834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960).
245. Bruce I. Ennis, staff attorney for the New York Civil Liberties Union and
the Mental Health Law Project, argues that:
[W]hile appointment of an inexperienced attorney to represent a mental patient may confer the aura of fairness, the attorney rarely provides the patient
with adequate or effective representation. Widespread reform will not come
until there is an available body of lawyers with specialized training in this
area.
Ennis, Mental Illness, 1969-70 ANNuAL SuvEy OF AMERICAN LAW 29 (1970).

246. Cohen, supra note 29, at 450; Wexler, Administration of Psychiatric Justice:
Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Aiuz. L. Rav. 1, 52 (1971).
247. Cohen, supra note 29, at 424.
248. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 239, at 46-54.
249. Wexler, supranote 246, at 53.
250. Similar feelings have been attributed to judges:
Little acclaim will come to him for ten aggressive patients successfully treated
in the community and little condemnation for -ten harmless patients needlessly
confined, but condemnation (and guilt) may hound him for one ill person released to the community who commits a serious assault.
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and
ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MIcE. L. Ruv. 1107, 1123 (1972).
251. Oran, supra note 151.
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'
Society would best be served by the Nazis."252
Another reader suggested that increased legal checks against psychiatric overdiagnosis
would lead to a cautious underdiagnosis which would leave many sick
people without treatment:
Who will these people and their relatives point to when adequate

treatment is not provided?

The lawyers who established the legal

standards? No, the psychiatrists, physicians and hospital personnel
expected to provide treatment. When legal action is taken, who will
represent -them?
You guessed it, the lawyers who established the
253
standards.
A policemen responded to the article with the argument that persons
who cannot be involuntarily committed may face imprisonment for
their dangerous acts, and thus would be worse off. 254 These reactions
suggest a general skepticism among the public to legal representation
of mental patients.
Resistance to legal procedures is not confined to cases in which
the prospective patient is released into the community. Some critics
argue that when the attempt to commit a person is successful, the necessity of going through a complicated legal proceeding will prove
detrimental to the patient's medical interests. 5 In the case of a paranoid patient, it is argued that "the experience of being confronted with
forensic argument invariably tends to aggravate his illness rather than
prepare him for acceptance of hospital care"2 56 by "arousing a feeling of public shame, creating a condition of maximum excitement and
confusion and . . . feeding his persecution delusion with objective evi-

dence a therapist would be hard put to rebut. '2 57 Psychiatrists and
many lawyers have supported the argument that some common procedural safeguards are countertherapeutic for the prospective patient.
The procedure most strongly criticized has been the right to a jury
which, it is contended, would introduce the kind of argumentation and
cross-examination found in criminal trials,25 8 thereby traumatizing the
252. Letter from George Keifer to the editor, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 145 (Dec.
1973).
253. Letter from Robert W. Taylor, Ph.D., to the editor, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
145 (Dec. 1973).
254. Letter from Sgt. M.A. Dunlavey to the editor, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 145
(Dec. 1973).
255. Kadish, supranote 12, at 96.
256. Yale Comment, supra note 7, at 1192.
257. Kadish, supra note 12, at 96.
258. A California prosecutor has argued that district attorneys would be forced to
push the prospective patient to the breaking point with tough questioning in order to
prove the patient's craziness--conjuring up visions of Captain Queeg's court martial in
the Caine Mutiny. Testimony of Jess Cannon, Cal. State Senate Judiciary Subcomm.
on Commitment Procedures for the Mentally Ill, Public Hearings, at 97 (Los Angeles,
Feb. 13 and 14, 1964).
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patient and humiliating the patient's family.25 9
It is interesting to note that while the presence of lawyers in the
commitment process is widely viewed as countertherapeutic, judges
are not viewed in the same way. The presence of a black-robed arbiter, it is often argued, may well convince the patient that justice has
been done.200 One distinguished jurist, who felt that there was little
room for a lawyer's skills in commitment proceedings and who doubted
his own technical ability to handle such cases, argued strongly that
a judge was better able to reassure a prospective patient that his or
her interests were being served than a medical board. 261 It can be
argued, however, that allowing the prospective patient the full protection of due process would be even more therapeutic. One observer
has noted that according the patient full legal rights may be "less traumatic than a mere pro forma proceeding which seeks to cut comers
on traditional legal paraphernalia."2 62 It has also been found that
democratic procedures can be a useful therapeutic tool in the setting
of a psychiatric hospital. 263 The elements of fairness and participation
that are basic to procedural due process may well have the same effect. With respect to juvenile courts the Supreme Court has noted
that informal procedures which lack due process protections can adversely affect treatment and rehabilitation.264 In civil commitment
hearings, therefore, the skills of both judges and lawyers -may
be needed to provide not just the appearance but the reality of fairness.
B.

The Representationof Juveniles in Other Cases

Representing children has not been a common function of attorneys in our legal system. A 1964 study concluded that "[t]he juvenile court in the United States has been a court with which the prac'
ticing lawyer has had little or no contact."265
Admittedly the Gault
decision has changed that situation somewhat. Nevertheless, except
259. Id. at 97. It has been shown that courtroom experiences can be made less
traumatic for the family of a mentally retarded child if the appropriate social agencies
properly prepare the parents for the experience, Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakal & Diamond, Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded: The California Experience, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 438, 481 (1972).
260. Testimony of Judge Allen Miller, Cal. State Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on
Commitment Procedures for the Mentally Ill, Public Hearings, at 135 (Los Angeles,
Feb. 13 and 14, 1964); testimony of Judge William A. Munnell, id. at 219.
261. B. BomN, TRmIL JmuDGE 266, 269 (1952).
262. Wexler, supra note 246, at 76.
263. R. RuBENSTEIN & H. LAsSwELL, THE SHARING OF POWER IN A PsYcATRIC
HOSPITAL (1966).

264. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
265. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in luvenile Court, 4 J. Fm. L.

77 (1964).
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for probate matters and tort suits which involve insurance company
lawyers, in most areas of the law-including commitment -to mental
institutions-children have not received adequate representation. ""
The reason for this is perhaps more closely related to economics than
to any legal doctrine. Generally children do not have independent
incomes with which to pay lawyers to represent their interests. 20 7 This
factor is particularly important where the child's rights are in direct
conflict with the interests of the parents.
But economics is not the sole answer to inadequate representation of children. Both children and lawyers need to learn how the
lawyer may serve the child's interests.2 68 Since children have often
lacked not only the financial resources but also the legal standing 0l
to retain counsel, lawyers are often confused about their own role in
representing juveniles.2
Defining the lawyer's role may be very difficult when the child involved is an infant, but should be easier when
the child is old enough to verbalize feelings about proposed institutionalization.
C.

The Representationof Juvenile Mental Patients

The major problem facing lawyers who represent juvenile mental
patients is that the children involved have no recognized rights to enforce. They should be accorded rights comparable to persons in similar situations. Statutes can be drafted which will codify their rights
without denying the benefits of treatment to those children who need
it. But the enforcement of these rights will depend on the right to
counsel.
1.

Providing Counselfor Juvenile Patients

Perhaps the hardest question in this entire area is: Which children are to be given the assistance of counsel? Since virtually none
266. Kleinfeld I, supranote 227, 4 FAM. L.Q. at 340-41.
267. Id.
268. Kleinfeld I, supra note 227, at 341.
269- E.g., in California a minor may not participate in litigation as either plaintiff
or defendant without the appointment of a guardian ad litem or a guardian of his estate.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 42 (West 1954); CAL. CODE OF Cirv. PRO. § 372 (West 1973).

Nor may the child retain a lawyer. Johnston v. So. Pacific Co., 150 Cal. 535, 89 P.
348 (1907).
270. The legal profession has too often been misled into assuming that its
task is simply that of accepting and effectuating plans for children made by
parents acting alone or in consultation with other professionals.
Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakel & Diamond, supra note 259, at 528. See, Inker & Perratta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MASS. L.Q. 229, 286 (1970).
See also J. GoLDSTE N, A. FREuD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHmD 65-67 (1973).
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of the minors involved will have independent income, some form of
public defender system or program of appointed counsel will be necessary. Should all children whose parents seek to have them institutionalized automatically be given a lawyer? Should the lawyer be
provided only when the child requests the assistance of counsel?
Should attorneys be provided in every case in which the child expresses a desire to contest the commitment? Should counsel be provided in every case unless the child expressly waives his or her right
to be represented?
There is no way of ascertaining whether a child facing commitment
needs a lawyer without knowing whether the child really wants to contest the commitment. And since the parents, their psychiatrist and
lawyer, cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of determining
whether the child is opposed to hospitalization, an independent party
must make that determination.
Should the child be able to waive the right to counsel? It is suggested that since one of the key issues in a commitment case
is whether the proposed patient is capable of making responsible decisions about his or her life, it is irrational to assume at the outset that
the person is capable of deciding to forego representation by an attorney. 7 1 Following this reasoning, one court has held that acceptance of the patient's request to discharge counsel will invalidate the
resulting commitment order.2 7
The California Supreme Court has
taken this concept one step further in the situation of a patient already
hospitalized and held -that a request for release triggers the right to
counsel where the patient has not consented to treatment.
In the case of juvenile commitments the argument against allowing waiver of counsel is even stronger, since the child may be even
less likely to assert a position about his or her own welfare when the
child's parents strongly oppose any action by the child to contest the
commitment.27 4 And jurisdictions which find a waiver of right to
counsel in the fact that a patient has not requested appointment of
an attorney would effectively limit that right. Courts have recognized
that a waiver of rights by a child is impermissible in some situations
in which an adult would be allowed to waive those rights, 275 and that
the confessions of juveniles made without consultation with counsel are
271.
272.
273.
(1970).
274.

275.

Cohen, supra note 29, at 448.
Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600
Kleinfeld I, supranote 227, at 345.

Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798, 803 (W.D. S.C. 1961); State ex
rel. Byrnes v. Goldman, 59 Misc. 2d 570, 302 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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particularly suspect.2 76 The same common-sense understanding which
required those results is controlling here.
2.

Services Which the Lawyer Can Provide for the Child-Client

In the system of juvenile commitments proposed in this Article, the most important function of the lawyer would be to ascertain
what the real wishes of the client are regarding the proposed hospitalization, and then to advocate the client's position. Eliciting the client's
preferences may require a more sophisticated approach in this kind
of case than is required in, for example, the typical corporate taxation
case. But the processes are basically parallel. The attorney must
first explain to the client what it is that the parents are seeking and
how this will affect him or her. The child must be informed of the
nature of the treatment to be received, the restrictions which would
be placed on the child during hospitalization, the possible outcomes
should the child desire to contest commitment, and the remedies available should the child wish to seek future release.
The nature of the hospital's restrictions will be particularly important for the child to understand. Is it a locked ward? How easy
is it to transfer to an unlocked ward? How limited are phone privileges? Are visits by parents possible? Are they required? Is it possible to have friends visit at the hospital? Must they be screened by
the hospital staff? Is mail censored? Is it a sex-segregated ward?
What limitations are placed on relationships between patients? How
does one get permission to leave the grounds? Must one be accompanied on such trips? What kind of activities are available? What kind
of activities are required? What kind of punishments are imposed for
breaking hospital rules? Who decides on the imposition of punishments? Is medication likely to be required, and if so, what kind? How
long is the hospitalization being recommended by the staff, or how long
is the average stay in this kind of ward? Will school be required, and
if so what kind? What kind of items are contraband on the ward
(matches, razors, televisions, hair dryers, drugs, liquor, pornography)?
These are the questions that an adolescent client may be most interested in and may be most likely to ask the lawyer. The lawyer may
find the answers by asking both hospital staff and patients.
There are other important factors which should be discussed with
the client as early as possible. The child should be counselled regarding possible adverse consequences of hospitalization which he or she
may face on release. These may include not only problems related
to social stigma, but more important, the likelihood that knowledge
276. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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of a prior commitment may prevent the client from getting the kind

of education or job he or she may want in the future. This involves
not just the nature of possible discrimination against the client as an
ex-mental-patient, but -also the question of how likely it is that prospective employers or schools wil find out about the hospitalization.
The lawyer should also discuss the likelihood of successfully challenging the proposed commitment, and the alternatives if hospitalization
is avoided. This is particularly important if the family situation is such
that it is not possible or desirable for the child to return home.
While giving the client this information, the lawyer should also
be seeking to find out how the client perceives his or her own condition and family situation. The lawyer will want to determine what
the clients think about their need for treatment; how they relate to
various forms of treatment; how they feel about living at home; and
how they evaluate the parents' request for hospitalization. It will be
important to elicit the client's true feelings, even if they are ambivalent. An initial response of "Whatever they want for me must be
best" or "They've been trying to get rid of me for years-they've
never loved me" may hide more complex emotions and attitudes. It
is only with some understanding of these complexities that the lawyer
can help the client determine what course of action is best suited to
his or her interests. Thus, the lawyer must above all be a perceptive
listener.
Once the attorney has ascertained what the client wants to do
about the proposed commitment, he or she has the obligation to pre7
sent these wishes in as effective a manner as possibleY.
7
If the child's
desire is to contest the proposed hospitalization, the first forum in
which the attorney should present the client's wishes is a negotiation
conference with the parents and hospital staff. It may be possible to
agree upon a less restrictive alternate setting in which the child can
receive treatment. Or the hospital staff may be persuaded that it is
only the child's presence in the family situation that is causing the disruption, and that placement in a group home or emancipation would
solve the problem. If an alternative to hospitalization is agreeable,
the attorney should explore possible sources of financial support for
the client in such a setting.
Even if these negotiations are unsuccessful, the information they
provide may be a useful form of pretrial discovery as the attorney prepares to represent the child's interests in a second forum-the courtroom. In the hearing, the lawyer will in most cases want to examine
the parents as witnesses in order to explore their reasons for seeking
the child's commitment, their perceptions of the child's problems, their
277. See Andalman & Chambers, supra note 239, at 46-54.
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relationship to the family's problems. It will also be important to present the proposed patient as a witness, since the judge will be unwilling to overrule the wishes of the parents and the judgment of the psychiatrists unless he or she is convinced that the child can successfully
handle some other arrangement. The most crucial part of presenting
the client's case at a juvenile commitment hearing may often be the
cross-examination of the psychiatrists who are recommending commitment2
Often it will be valuable to present the testimony of other psychiatrists or mental health professionals who have interviewed the client
and who do not believe commitment is required.
If commitment is ordered by the judge at the conclusion of the
hearing, or if the client decides not to contest the commitment, there
are other functions which the lawyer should perform. One is to help
the client settle any personal affairs which may be affected by hospitalization-things which may range from taking care of a car to arranging a smooth withdrawal from school, protecting if possible the
right to re-enroll when hospitalization has ended. There may also be
financial arrangements which have to be made-providing for installment payments which may be due, adjusting any property or trust interests the client may have, and most important, determining how the
cost of hospitalization is to be met.
Finally, while the lawyer should try to avoid becoming a middleperson in future power struggles between the client and the hospital
(or parents) because of the detrimental impact that might have on
the client's acceptance of ordered treatment, it is appropriate for the
attorney to reassure the client that counsel will again be available at
the time of the periodic review of commitment, and may also be available if problems arise concerning in-hospital civil liberties.2 79 The
knowledge that there is someone on the "outside" who is concerned
about his or her fate after hospitalization may be one of the most valuable things a lawyer can give to a child-client.
VII
ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS FOR CHILDREN WHO ARE
NOT HOSPITALIZED

Home is where, when you go there, they have to take you in.

While parents may incorrectly conclude that their child requires
psychiatric hospitalization, they may be entirely correct when they de278. A useful guide in preparing for such cross-examination is J. ZiSKIN, COPING
wrm PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (1970). See also A. WATSON, PsyCHIATRY FOR LAWYFRS 305-10 (1968).

279. See Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447 (1973).
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cide that they can no longer tolerate the child's behavior."' The conclusion may be the same even though the child is not the major contributor to the family pathology. 28 2 Thus, under the proposed system
of judicially scrutinized juvenile commitments, the family may be unwilling to take the child back into the family home when the petition
to commit the child is denied.
The problem of alternative disposition arises when the court denies the parents' petition for commitment, when the child's request to
withdraw from the hospital is granted, or when the child is released
after a hearing required by a periodic review statute. In none of these
situations does the court's decision solve the family problems which
may have prompted the parents to seek the child's commitment. For
whatever reasons, some families refuse to accept a member who has
been discharged from a mental hospital; this is especially true for lowincome families 2 3 and in cases of extended hospitalization.28 4 Since
children are often economically and emotionally ill-equipped to fend
for themselves, some individual or institution will have to assume the
familial function if the child's right to contest his or her hospitalization
285
is to be meaningful.
One court recently faced this situation in a case involving children
who, prior to their hospitalization under a voluntary juvenile statute,
had been wards of the state.
n In re Lee,28 8 the court concluded
that the children's right to seek their own discharge was abridged by
the lack of dispositional alternatives available to them, and that therefore the state had an obligation to find suitable placements for the
children who had successfully contested their hospitalization.
In Lee, the state had a pre-existing duty to care for the children
as wards of the juvenile court. The state may have no such encom280. R.

FROST,

The Death of the Hired Man, in ROBERT FROST:

POETRY AND

PROSE 17-22 (E. Lathem & L. Thompson eds. 1972).

281. See text accompanying notes 57-61, supra.
282. See text accompanying notes 112-27, supra.
283. T. Lmz, supra note 63, at 130. See also Whatley, Social Attitudes toward
Discharged Mental Patients, in Tim MENTAL PATiENT: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE 401 (S. Spitzer & N. Denzin eds. 1968); Crocetti, Spiro & Siassi, Are the
Ranks Closed? Attitudinal Social Distance and Mental Illness, 127 AM. J.PSYCHIAT.
112 (1971).
284. Pokorny & Bentinck, A Study of Relatives' Views of State Mental Hospital
Patients,50 SOCIAL CASEWORK 519, 525 (1969).
285. It has been held that the state cannot continue to hospitalize a person no
longer in need of treatment on the grounds that his or her relatives refuse to accept
him or her into their homes. Application of the Director of Creedmore State Hosp.,
62 Misc. 2d 830, 310 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
286. No. 68 (JD) 1362 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Juv. Div., Ill. Aug. 24, 1972) (ordering the preparation of plans for placement of discharged children and requiring
monthly reports evaluating each ward's progress) abstracted in 6 CLEAINmGHOUSE REv.
575 (Jan. 1973).
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passing pre-existing duty when children are committed by their parents. But courts could impose an obligation on the state when parents
are unwilling to take a judicially-released child back into the home.
One model for such judicial dispositional power can be found in statutes giving juvenile courts jurisdiction over dependent and neglected
children.28 7 Assistance in finding alternate dispositions for children
whose commitment petitions are denied could be required of the child's
attorney and the hospital staff. When the child is in need of psychiatric treatment-but not commitment-the court may opt for placement with a community mental health center,28 8 or in a group home,

half-way house, or foster home.28 9 Partial or total emancipation may
be appropriate for teenagers who do not require close supervision. 9 0

Court inquiry into alternative living and treatment situations has
been required by some judges and legislatures in the case of adult
mental patients. In Lake v. Cameron"1 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that alternatives less restrictive than confinement must be considered in habeas corpus proceedings. 2 12 In Covington v. Harris293 the same court implied that the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives required under the District of Columbia statute
287.

E.g.,

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §

600 (West 1972).

288. For a description of some of these facilities, and of crisis intervention
centers, see Wexler, supra note 246, at 118-46.
289. However, growth of the community mental health movement could lead to
an undesirable expansion of the class of persons subjected to compulsory treatment.
Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally Ill, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv.
93, 102 (1967). Arguably, since care in an outpatient treatment facility involves far
less drastic infringements of the patient's liberty than does hospitalization, the procedural safeguards and strict standards of proof required for commitment are unnecessary.
In practice, this would expand the class of persons subject to involuntary, non-institutional treatment to include those who would benefit from such treatment but who do
not meet the stricter standard of dangerousness to themselves or to others. In most
states, compulsory hospitalization can already be ordered for non-dangerous persons
found to be "in need of treatment," and the increasing availability of less restrictive
facilities may encourage this trend.
For a comparative discussion of various bases for civil commitment (e.g., "need
of treatment," danger to self, or danger to others), see Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966); Livermore,
Malmquist & Meeml, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
75 (1968).
290. In re Cameron M., (P. Ct., Dist. of New Haven, Conn. Jan. 1974).
291. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
292. Ms. Lake suffered from senility and forgetfulness. Although she posed no
danger to others, she was confined to a mental hospital for her own protection. The
denial of her writ of habeas corpus was reversed because the District Court failed to
consider less restrictive alternatives as required by a local statute. Some alternatives
suggested by the court did not involve "treatment." Since Ms. Lake's problem involved
absent-minded wandering, the court suggested that wearing an identification tag would
be sufficient protection. Id. at 661.
293. 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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in Lake was also constitutionally required under due process. Such
a right is consistent with constitutional requirements for less restrictive alternatives in other situations,294 and may have therapeutic value
since mental health professionals generally believe that persons suf-

fering from mental illness respond best to care provided in noninstitutional environments.295
The arguments for requiring that adult patients be treated in the
community or in settings which do not unnecessarily restrict their liberty should also be applicable to juveniles. However, a child's right

to live without continual supervision has not been judicially recognized.
While children normally are in the custody and control of their parents or guardians 29 6 it is clear that the courts have the power to assume
the supervision of children in order to protect the public interest.
Juvenile courts often require noninstitutional treatment of children

who have been adjudicated "in need of supervision," 29 ' and extending
this power to the juvenile commitment situation will give the courts

greater incentive to refuse authorization of unnecessary commitments
to mental hospitals. A conscientious judge faced with only two
choices-hospitalization or no treatment for the child-may err on the

side of hospitalization.

If commitment is denied, the court should

have jurisdiction to order alternative treatment or living arrangements

which are appropriate for the individual. 98
In a recent study of the child custody problem, Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit have suggested several concepts
which are useful while analyzing institutionalization and alternatives. 2 9 The first of these is the crucial importance of an ongoing

relationship with at least one adult who assumes a parental role.300
294. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (state law infringing
freedom of association struck down where "less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose" existed); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)
(local ordinance which burdened interstate commerce struck down because "reasonable
and adequate alternatives [were] available"); Chambers, supra note 250, at 1145-51;
Wormuth and Mirkin, The Doctrine of Reasonable Alternatives, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254
(1964).
295. Chambers, supra note 250, at 1113.
296. Any right of parents to compel their children to undergo noninstitutional psychiatric treatment is beyond the scope of this Article. No cases have been found
which address this issue. But cf. In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972)
(holding that under state law a parent could not force her teenage daughter to have
an abortion).
297. Some states attach this label to their incorrigibility statutes. E.g., N.Y. SoCiAL WELFARE LAW § 371.6 (West 1966).
298. Any alternative should be subject to the same automatic periodic review required in hospitalization cases.
299. J. GorDsTmN, A. REui & A. SoLNrr, BnYoND TnE B sT IrTREsTS oF T
Crnw (1973).
300. Id. at 17.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:840

One implication of this finding is that institutionalization of the child
should be avoided whenever it is not absolutely necessary, and its
duration should be minimized whenever possible. In the case of a
seriously dysfunctional family, the parents may not be filling that role,
but in such cases, placing the child in a setting where some person
will perform that role is clearly preferable to institutionalization. Another implication is that where such a role is established with a parent,
but where serious problems have arisen in the family, a family treatment approach is preferable to one in which the child is removed from
the home setting.
A second concept presented by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit is
that the child's concept of time may be greatly different than that perceived by adults. 301 What might seem to be a relatively short time
for adults may be excruciatingly long for a child-especially a young
child. Since institutionalization has a particularly harmful impact on
children, the fact that such a stay in the hospital is perceived as being
very long makes -the impact even worse. A time limit should
be placed on the duration of a child's involuntary stay in a hospital
unless the commitment is based on dangerousness, and in any event,
the amount of time in 'the hospital should be kept to the minimum
necessary period in any indivdiual case. In pursuit of that goal, periodic judicial review of commitments is required at fairly frequent intervals. While it might be argued that such frequent disruption of
the therapeutic process in order to call into question the hospitalization itself might be countertherapeutic in many cases, such considerations are outweighed by the importance of keeping hospitalizations of
all children as short as possible, and to reassure the child at frequent
intervals that he or she has not been forgotten-that there are those
on "the outside" who continue to be concerned about the child's fate
and who are looking after his or her interests.
Finally, the authors of the study contend that the traditional goal
in juvenile cases of "the best interest of the child" is insufficient in
light of these facts, and that it should be replaced with the standard
of "the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the
child's growth and development. ' 30 2 It is hoped that by providing judicial scrutiny of decisions to commit children, and by trying to assure
that alternative solutions short of institutionalization receive serious
consideration in each case, this standard can be met under a new system of juvenile commitments.
301.
302.

J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLN1T, supra note 299, at 40.
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLNrr, supra note 299, at 53.
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VM
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO VOLUNTARY JUVENILE

COMMITMENT STATUTES

The Supreme Court recently noted that: "Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
constitutional limitations or this [commitment] power have not been
more frequently litigated.' 303 The only Supreme Court cases dealing
with commitment of persons suspected of mental illness have involved
defendants originally incarcerated as criminals or under quasi-criminal
procedures for mentally defective sex-offenders. 04 The courts appear
more comfortable applying established criminal procedures, than formulating new standards for those whose only alleged "crime" is their
craziness. The rights of the mentally ill have been extended by equal
protection comparisons with the criminal procedure requirements of
the Bill of Rights, but little attention has been paid to due process
arguments when no obvious comparison to criminal cases presented
itself. Juvenile voluntary commitment statutes may be more vulnerable to due process attacks than to equal protection challenges. Opponents of the existing juvenile commitment process should focus on
the many procedural defects of that system rather than merely urging
the application of the fairer, but still inadequate, system already applied to other classes of cases. This section briefly discusses the equal
protection and due process arguments available to opponents of the
current juvenile voluntary commitment system.
A.

Equal Protection

An equal protection analysis of parental commitment of juveniles
must begin with a determination of the classes to be compared. The
complaining class would be potential juvenile patients subject to "voluntary" commitment at the request of their parents. The adult class
with whom the juveniles are to be contrasted may be composed of
either adult voluntary patients or adult patients who have been committed involuntarily. If voluntary patients are chosen, the claim
would be that juveniles were denied equal protection when they were
committed without their informed consent, since all adults admitted
under -the statute must consent to admission. Furthermore, although
technically "voluntary patients," juveniles are denied the right to re303. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
304. Chambers, supra note 250. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967);
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); and the earliest Supreme Court case on the
subject, Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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quest their own release-a right afforded to all adult voluntary patients. If involuntarily committed adult patients were to constitute the
comparison class, juveniles could claim that they were denied equal
protection when they were not afforded procedural rights granted to
adults similarly hospitalized against their will. Such rights might include notice and hearing requirements, rights within the commitment
proceedings themselves, and any post-commitment rights to periodic
review, habeas corpus, or automatic release recognized by a given
state.
Another equal protection approach would be for juveniles admitted under voluntary statutes to claim they were denied rights accorded to adults patients generally, thus forcing the state to elect
whether to proceed under the adult voluntary patient statute-requiring the child's consent to hospitalization and preserving the right to
subsequently request discharge-or under the adult involuntary patient statute-in which case adult involuntary commitment procedures
would apply. Putting the state to such an election would give the advantage of admission and treatment while preserving the right to seek
release. But the election raises the problem of determining which
children are appropriate for the voluntary procedures (with release
possibilities) and which should be subjected to the closer scrutiny of
involuntary commitment procedures. A successful challenge on any
of these equal protection comparisons is likely to have identical results:
If the child objects to hospitalization or requests release from an institution, and if the state or the parents persist in seeking or continuing
hospitalization, the involuntary commitment procedures-or something
closely resembling them-would be employed to determine whether
the child could be hospitalized against his or her will.
1.

ChallengingJuvenile Commitments under the
"RationalBasis" Test

Absent a finding of a "suspect classification" or "fundamental interest," juvenile patients are denied equal protection of the laws only
if there is no "rational basis" for the state's decision to treat the admission of adult and juvenile mental patients differently. 305 A number of arguably legitimate state purposes can be put forward as the
basis for distinguishing between children and adults in commitment
proceedings: the need to provide hospitalization for those too young
to seek help themselves, the recognition of parental interest in procuring treatment for the mentally ill offspring, or the importance of pro305. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1076
(1969).
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viding mental health care at an early age when it may have the greatest chances of success. Since the state is required to show only a
veneer of rationality under this test, any of these state interests would
probably be held sufficient to justify different commitment procedures
for adults and juveniles.
2.

Testing Juvenile Commitments under a "Compelling
State Interest" Test

This test is used when the state employs a suspect classification
or infringes on a fundamental interest of the disadvantaged class. The
state must demonstrate that its objective cannot be met in a nondiscriminatory manner, -and that the benefit gained by the measure outweighs the detriment suffered by the class which is the subject of the
discrimination. Defenders of the existing juvenile commitment system
would be hard pressed to show that a state's interest in denying children any judicial scrutiny over the commitment decision is compelling.
Since hearings and other advantages of due process are provided for
adult mental patients, it would be difficult to prove that putting a child
through the "ordeal" of a hearing is a vastly more dangerous and countertherapeutic process. It would be equally difficult for the state to
prove that there is no practical alternative by which it could provide
mental health services for young people, or that there is no other feasible way to resolve family disputes about whether the child needs hospitalization. The state's interest in giving parents total discretion over
the hospitalization of their children has never been carefully articulated, and even when reasons are suggested, they hardly appear compelling.
In view of the attractiveness of the compelling state interest test,
it will be important to argue its applicability to the challenge. One
contention might be that age is a suspect classification. Discriminations
on the basis of race, 306 alienage, 30 7 and sex3° s have been held to require a compelling state interest. Like recognized suspect classes suffering discrimination, children have been excluded from participation
in community affairs and are politically disadvantaged. 30 9 But unlike
other groups which have been granted constitutional protection, children cannot claim that a history of discriminatory legislation indicates
306. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
307. E.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
308. Four Justices of the United States Supreme Court held sex to be a suspect
classification in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The California Supreme Court found sex a suspect classification in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d
1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
309. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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that childhood is viewed as a badge of opprobrium.8 10 Neither can
it be argued that childhood is a permanent condition."' The most
persuasive argument against treating children as a suspect class is a
practical rather than doctrinal one: While the political disabilities of
children are real and obvious, such a ruling might jeopardize all laws
which treat children and adults differently. On a whole range of issues-including support, education, and employment-there is wide
social consensus that children should not be subject to the same laws
as adults. While some of these laws may be unwise and injurious to
the real interests of children, or unconstitutional on other grounds, a
declaration that the state can treat children differently from adults only
in the most extreme circumstances is a weapon far too blunt for the
correction of these injustices.
Therefore, a more likely way of triggering the compelling state
interest test is by a showing that the discrimination infringes a fundamental interest of the child who is unwillingly hospitalized. Recognized fundamental interests include voting,3 12 procreation, 13 interstate
travel,3 14 and the procedural rights of criminal defendants. 8
The
common thread running through these fundamental interests seems to
be the severity of the detriment imposed on the complaining party.81 0
While a standard based on imposed detriment may be imprecise, it
would be difficult to argue that being involuntarily locked up in a mental institution is not a sufficiently severe detriment to warrant close judicial scrutiny of a discriminatory system. Recognition that criminal
procedures involve a fundamental interest 17 is based primarily on a
similar deprivation of physical liberty and imposition of lasting social
stigma. The constitutional status of involuntary incarceration should
not depend upon whether the victim is confined in a prison or in a mental hospital. 31
The deprivation of personal liberty that results from
confinement in a mental hospital should require a compelling state Interest to justify any discrimination.3 1 9
310. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 1065, 1127
(1969). While opprobrium does not attach to being a child, legal inferiority is attached
to the status.
311. Id. at 1126. See also Note, Mental Illness, A Suspect Classification?, 83
YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
312. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
313. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
314. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
315. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
316. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Hnv. L. Rnv. 1065, 1130
(1969).
317. Douglas v. California, 327 U.S. 353 (1963).
318. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
319. mhe fact that the curtailment of liberty by civil commitment is
so total and that civil-commitment legislation does not by its terms refer to
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3.

Challengingthe Juvenile Commitment System Under an
"IntensifiedMeans Scrutiny" Test3"'

Under this test, the court would avoid intensive examination of
the goals of state legislation and instead direct its scrutiny toward the
reasonableness of the methods used by the state to -achieve those
goals. 21 The court could find that the state might reasonably encourage hospitalization of mentally ill juveniles, and could use different
procedures for juveniles and adults to achieve -this goal. But any intensified scrutiny of the present juvenile voluntary system will reveal
that the means developed by the state are unduly restrictive because
the state's goal can practicably be -accomplished without completely
curtailing the rights of juvenile patients. This judicial approach seems
better suited to the juvenile commitment problem than either the rational basis test or the compelling state interest test. Considerations
involved in the proposed hospitalization of a child may differ from the
adult admission situation. Because of the potential for parental intimidation of children, the state might well provide for judicial inquiry
into the real wishes of a child who "agrees" to hospitalization. The
means scrutiny test would permit reasonable state responses to such
differences. The means scrutiny test would also prevent the judiciary
from overlooking the vast discrepancies between adult and children's
rights under the present system.
4.

The Applicability of Equal ProtectionAnalysis to the
Juvenile Commitment System

The courts have frequently used the equal protection clause to
strike down laws relating to the mentally ill. The leading Supreme
Court case is Baxstrom v. Herold,122 in which a prisoner had been
administratively committed as insane toward the end of his prison
term. The Court noted that this administrative procedure bypassed the
state's guarantee of a jury trial on the issue of commitability, and held
that "the State, having made this substantial review proceeding gen"travel," to "association," or to sexual relations with one's spouse may, by
some ironic and inappropriate process, appear to make such rights irrelevant
to an analysis of the issues surrounding civil commitment. Much the same
problem is posed in discussing the seriousness of a policeman's killing of a
fleeing suspect in terms of its impact on the suspect's right to trial by jury.
Perhaps an unconscious desire to deny the impact of confinement (or killing)
leads us to refuse to think seriously about the loss of freedom involved.
Chambers, supra note 250, at 1162.
320. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnv.
L. REv. 1, 24 (1972).
321.

Id.

322.

383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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erally available on this issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it
from some."323 Other courts have relied upon Baxstrom and the
equal protection clause in striking down procedures used to commit,
as insane, those acquitted of crimes, where the procedures were substantially less rigorous than those in civil commitment proceedings."'
Only one case has been found in which a court used an equal protection analysis to grant rights to one class of non-criminal mental patients
which had previously been granted to another class of civil patients.
In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that a civil patient
administratively transferred from involuntary to voluntary status was
denied equal protection of the laws because "voluntary" patients
lacked the substantive rights of involuntary patients.3 23
Despite the seeming applicability of these same equal protection
arguments to juveniles admitted under voluntary statutes, two factors
make equal protection a less than perfect vehicle for challenging the
constitutionality of these laws. First, the courts may be reluctant to
use equal protection because, even if age is not declared a suspect
classification, courts may fear setting precedents for later cases contesting the many laws which treat children and adults differently.
The other problem with an equal protection challenge is that it
might prove to be a hollow victory for the child, since in many jurisdictions, the rights of adult mental patients have been left undefined
by 'the court. Thus, the winner of an equal protection challenge who
achieved equality with adult patients might find that the state's adult
commitment statutes provide few procedural protections. A related
problem is the vulnerability of equal protection rights, for as one jurist
has noted, reliance on equal protection to extend procedural rights to
new classes of mental patients implies that the legislature has the
power
3 20
everyone.
from
rights
those
withdrawing
by
to avoid the problem
Despite these drawbacks, equal protection has one advantage for
the litigant challenging these laws. Equal protection arguments allow the
plaintiff to demonstrate the stark contrast between juvenile rights and
those enjoyed by adults in a partcular jurisdiction. Thus, it would
be sound strategy for those challenging juvenile commitment statutes
to include equal protection arguments-perhaps emphasizing the
32
means scrutiny approach-along with any due process challenge. 7
323. id. at 111. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
324. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
325. In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968).
The opinion also rested on due process grounds.
326. Id. at 394, 244 N.E.2d at 682, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 104 (Keating, J., concurring).
327. Rejecting Justice Black's suggestion that equal protection was also an appro-
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B.

Due Process

The current juvenile commitment system contains no due process
protections. No notice, no hearing, no counsel, no cross-examination,
no witnesses are required. No burden or standard of proof exists be-

cause nothing need be proven. Once due process is seen as an appropriate direction for inquiry regarding the constitutionality of the system, the inquiry necessarily focuses on what due process elements
should be required. The most -fruitful starting point would appear to
be the procedural rights of nonjuvenile mental patients.

The Supreme Court has never defined the due process rights of
mental patients, but the undeniable similarity between involuntary

commitment and criminal imprisonment has been noted by many authorities. 8 The Supreme Court has forbidden the state to deny procedural rights simply by labelling the proceedings and subsequent incar-

ceration "civil" rather than "criminal."3 29 This rule has been held applicable to a mentally retarded child institutionalized in what was called

a school for the feeble-minded.33 There is no reason to view differently a child locked up in an institution called a mental hospital.
For a time, the most sweeping lower court decision on the due

process rights of mental patients was Lessard v. Schmidt,3s1 in which
priate basis for decision, the Supreme Court relied upon due process to extend protection to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Due process standards allow the states some flexibility while requiring procedures
which guarantee a basic level of fairness. Still majority opinion is replete with comparisons between adults' rights in criminal proceedings and the lack of similar rights in
juvenile proceedings.
328. E.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUms (1968); T. SzAsz, PsYcmArnc JUsTICE 238-41
(1965). The foremost authorities on the subject also agree: "Many of the patients
.. . do not consider it a hospital but rather a prison, and an extremely undesirable
prison at that." Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results
and Problems, 119 AW. J.PsycrwT. 713, 720 (1963).
329. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court exalted substance over form:
The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty
for years. It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His
world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . .. ." Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians,
state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
"due process."
id. at.27-28 (footnotes omitted).
330. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
331. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1078 (1974).
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a three-judge federal court struck down Wisconsin's civil commitment
statute because prospective patients were denied various due process

rights.3" 2 The Lessard court found it constitutionally impermissible
to detain a patient in a hospital for a significant period of time without
a hearing 33 and required that patients be given notice of the mandatory hearing." 4 The court ruled that the standard for finding com-

mitment necessary should be "beyond a reasonable doubt" and not
merely "by a preponderance of the evidence,

'335

-that full-time invol-

untary hospitalization should be ordered only when less drastic means
are not available, 33 6 that the burden of proof must be on the party

recommending hospitalization,3 37 that the patient has a right to appointed counsel, 3 8 that the patient's statements could not be introduced
by the state unless the patient knew she had the right to remain silent,3 39 and that the standard rules of hearsay should apply in a civil
commitment hearing. 340 Although the court thought the presence of
counsel at the psychiatric interview was not necessary to assure that
the patient understood the privilege against self-incrimination, it established due process rights basically parallel to those guaranteed in criminal proceedings.
While these rights had been individually extended to mental pa-

tients in other cases, 341 Lessard was generally viewed as the most authoritative judicial exposition on due process in civil commitments.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's order vacating and remanding Lessard342 has created considerable uncertainty. While the remand does
not appear to go to the merits of the decision, the Supreme Court may

have felt the district court had gone too far. If so, one can only specu332. Id. at 1103.
333. Id. at 1090.
334. Id. at 1092.
335. Id. at 1093.
336. Id. at 1095.
337. Id. at 1096.
338. Id. at 1097.
339. Id. at 1101.
340. Id. at 1103.
341. E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D Pa.
1971); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
342. 94 S. Ct. 1078 (1974). The injunction against further commitments under
the invalidated statute was not sufficiently specific. More recently, another three-judge
Federal District Court issued a Lessard-like decision regarding Michigan's commitment
laws, but avoided granting injunctive relief. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital,
F. Supp. - (E.D. Mich., Consol. Civil Action No. 36384, June 4, 1974). A state
court also reached a similar result in South Dakota. Schneider v. Radack (South Dakota Circuit Court, 1st Jud. Dist., May 3, 1974, unreported decision on file with the
Mental Health Law Project, 1751 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036).
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late about what the Justices had in mind, especially since the lower
court's opinion covered so many issues.
Though the precedential value of Lessard may be impaired, precedent remains for -the proposition that criminal due process standards
must be approximated in civil commitment cases. In Dixon v. Attorney
General of Pennsylvania,4 3 another three-judge federal court found
many of the Lessard procedures to be constitutionally required. Several federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly required particular
due process protections,' 44 and several Supreme Court cases have extended due process rights to adult mental patients.3 45
The analogy to criminal law is not a perfect one; some of the
procedures required in criminal cases may be inappropriate for civil
commitment. 4 6 But such exceptions, if they exist, should be justified
by persuasive reasons. For example, Gault347 established that in juvenile court proceedings, children are entitled to notice of the charges
against them, the right -to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination, 48 but the
Court later held that due process did not require the right to a jury
trial in juvenile court, because that particular right might be incompatible with the operations of that court.3 49 Similarly, it has been argued
that in civil commitment proceedings, due process should be "adapted"
to the therapeutic needs of the patient.35 0 If this rationale is used
to exclude any of the traditional due process protections in civil commitment cases, the right to a jury trial is probably the most "dispensable" and the most "countertherapeutic." 3' 1 But aside from this possible exception, a long line of decisions has established that the due
process requirements long applied in the criminal courts are also re3 52
quired by due process in civil commitment cases.
343. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
344. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); U.S. ex reI. Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969); Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
345. See note 304 supra.
346. See text accompanying notes 350-53 infra.
347. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
348. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 56.
349. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 402 U.S. 528 (1971). However, the right to jury
trials may be constitutionally required in commitment proceedings notwithstanding McKeiver. See In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
350. Kadish, supra note 12. Fewer commentators now argue that due process can
be drastically curtailed or "streamlined" for civil commitment cases because procedural
protections do not serve the therapeutic interest of the patient.
351. But see note 349 supra.
352. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940);
Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938); People ex rel. Sullivan v. Wendel, 68
N.Y.S. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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In conclusion, it should be noted that the 'two constitutional challenges most applicable to the juvenile commitment situation-due
process and the means scrutiny approach to equal protection-should
lead to similar results. The means scrutiny test would invalidate the
current system as unnecessarily restrictive of juveniles' rights in light
of the state's purpose. Under due process, some variations from adult
commitment procedure would be permissible, but the vast disparity
between current procedures for hospitalizing children and adults
would be invalidated. By either analysis, the existing system would
be found wanting and the state would need ,to create a new system
for juvenile commitments:3 53 one which varies from the adult system
only where such variations are dictated by the different needs of children, 354 and which provides procedural safeguards required by due
process.
IX
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM FOR JUVENILE COMMITMENT

An acceptable juvenile commitment system will take into account
the developmental differences between adults and children, the child's
family situation, and procedural safeguards designed to protect the
child's interests.
A.

Precommitment Hearing

One way to ensure that every child has an impartial determination
of his need for hospitalization is to require a judicial hearing whenever
hospitalization is sought. 3 5 There are, however, disadvantages to
such a system. A stressful and superfluous legal proceeding could
not be avoided even if the child agreed to hospitalization. Voluntary
admission laws enable adults to submit to hospitalization without a
hearing.3 50 But juveniles committed under current voluntary statutes
are not volunteering-rather they are being "volunteered" by their
parents. 3 57 When the juvenile actually desires hospitalization, there
should be some mechanism by which he can avoid a full-fledged court
hearing. Finally, a mandatory judicial hearing for every child,
353. If the existing system were struck down the state could still hospitalize children under the adult involuntary commitment statutes. However, the adult system may
itself be unconstitutional and in any case does not consider the special needs of children.
354. If juvenile commitment procedures are made more rigorous, adult patients
may have a valid equal protection claim.
355. This could be the practical result-at least temporarily-if voluntary juvenile
admission statutes are declared unconstitutional, since adult involuntary commitment
statutes would then be the only method by which children could be committed.
356.

See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.

357.

See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
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whether or not he or she contests commitment, is likely to create an
assembly line process of ritual hearings. Such empty exercises may
actually diminish the attention judges would otherwise devote to cases
in which the child objects to commitment.
B.

Delayed Commitment Hearing

A second possible approach would allow parents to commit their
children without judicial supervision, as under current statutes, but
would permit the child to seek his or her own release after a minimum
period in the hospital-perhaps ninety days. This system would attempt to balance the parent's interest in being able to seek treatment
for the child against the child's interest in avoiding unnecessary hospitalization. This plan would also permit deferral of decision making until
an observation period has elapsed, during which the hospital staff
could consider the child's problems and needs more carefully than in
a short pre-admission interview. This time might also be useful to the
parents and child as a cooling off period, a time to gain perspective
on the stressful events which led the parents to seek the child's hospitalization.
Providing compulsory precommitment hearings and child-initiated
release procedures would not prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of children who need no treatment. While the observation period
might be kept quite short by -adult standards, according to a child's
sense of time even a few days in the strange and frightening surroundings of even the best mental hospital may be a terrifying and traumatic
ordeal. Such an experience should be inflicted on a child only when
absolutely necessary. In fact, a child who does not need hospitalization at the time of commitment may learn "crazy" behavior from the
culture of the mental hospital.3 5 8 Thus, a better plan would retain
the advantages of this proposal but also prevent totally unnecessary
hospitalizations from occurring in the first place.
C.

Waiver of PrecommitmentHearing

The child could be allowed to waive a formal hearing and consent to the hospitalization after consultation with an attorney.3" 9 Safe358. See text accompanying notes 157-160 supra.
359. Since the parents are usually antagonistic parties and since the child is considered incompetent to enter binding contracts and usually indigent, the court must appoint counsel. Such a practice may foster a corps of knowledgeable and experienced
juvenile commitment attorneys. Attorney's fees may be taxed to the parents. It is not
unusual to bind parents by the acts of their children. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 903 (West 1966) (parents liable for institutionalization costs of delinquent
child); In re Shaieb, 250 Cal. App. 2d 553, 58 Cal. Rptr. 631 (4th Dist. 1967). The
role of the attorney is discussed in Section VI of this Article, supra.
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guards, such as retaining the right to seek release in a later hearing,
should be provided to prevent this system from camouflaging a return
to unbridled parental discretion. Therefore, an appointed attorney
should certify to the court having jurisdiction in juvenile commitment
cases that he or she has: 1) consulted with the child about the proposed commitment, 2) explained to the child both the right to contest -the commitment and the possible alternatives to commitment, and
3) ascertained that it is the true wish of the child to enter the hospital
and forego a judicial proceeding. The child might be required to sign
a document stating that he or she does not wish to contest the hospitalization. But the more important document would be the attorney's, since it would record the child's feelings about hospitalization
and attitude toward challenging the parents' wishes. If both documents indicate to the judge that the child really does not want to contest hospitalization, the judge would rule that the child has validly
waived the right to a hearing and may be hospitalized.
D.

Postcommitment JudicialReview

If a child waives the commitment hearing and later wants to be
released from the hospital, a hearing should be mandatory if the release is contested. Such a deferred hearing would differ from the
usual habeas corpus hearing in that the parties seeking to continue
hospitalization, the parents or the hospital, should still carry the same
risk of nonpersuasion. If the presumption against hospitalization and
the right to a hearing were not relinquished by consenting to commitment, the child's initial decision would not be made to hinge on legal
procedures.
The right to release should be conditioned on notice to the hospital of an intent to sign out. A similar notice requirement, three to
ten days for example, is presently required of voluntary adult patients
in many jurisdictions. During the notice period, the hospital staff and
the parents may prepare to contest the child's release or they may prepare living arrangements for the child-either at home or in some alternative living situation. 60 Once the child files a notice of intent
to leave the hospital and the hospital or parents file a notice of intent
to contest the release, a hearing would be mandatory.
Just as a juvenile should not be allowed to waive his right to
counsel prior to commitment, so hospitalization of a child should not
go unreviewed for a long period of time, nor should judicial scrutiny
depend on the child's uncounseled initiative in submitting a notice of
intent to seek release. The system should contain a provision for
mandatory periodic review of all cases of committed children, regard360.

See text at notes 282-302, supra.
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less of whether the commitment was initially contested. Adult commitment laws of some states contain such provisions,3 61 but they are
even more necessary for children. Institutionalization can have a particularly damaging effect on children, 362 and should 'be minimized.
The child's perception of time3"' also accentuates the need for periodic
review; what seems like a relatively short hospitalization to parents and
hospital staff may be experienced as a very long confinement by the
child. Finally, children may be more susceptible to intimidation than
adults and less likely to attempt to exercise their rights to release. Periodic review would require the hospital staff to justify the continued
confinement of the child and encourage the staff to use treatment
methods which will withstand judicial scrutiny. And, not least important, it would give the child periodic reassurance that he has not been
forgotten.
E. Juvenile Initiatedand Emergency Commitment
Provision should also be made for two other methods by which
juveniles could be admitted to mental hospitals. The first of these
could go by the traditional name "voluntary admission," but since that
term has taken on other meanings in the juvenile context, a better
term might be "self-initiated admission." Older juveniles should be
able to seek their own hospitalization without the consent of their parents. They should, however, always be advised of the alternatives to
hospitalization, and some protection should be provided to assure that
the initiative is really that of the child, and not of parents trying to
avoid the procedural requirements of the proposed system of parentrequested juvenile commitments. Thus, the statute should require
every juvenile seeking hospitalization to consult with counsel in the
same manner as children whose admission is sought by their parents.
Finally, some provision should be made for emergency hospitalization when the child is in danger of harming himself or others. Competing considerations are involved. On the one hand, even the expedited procedures for juvenile admissions outlined above would require
too much time for a child facing a real emergency. On the other
hand, emergency commitment statutes have been grossly abused in the
past." 4 A not altogether satisfactory compromise, taking into account
361. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND TIM LAW 164-66 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds.
1971). Such periodic review has proven perfunctory when it becomes strictly a medical procedure without judicial scrutiny. R. RocK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HosPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 218 (1968).
362. See text accompanying notes 157-64 supra.
363. See text accompanying note 302 supra.
364. Roth, Lerner & Daley, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400 (1973).
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the greater impact on children of both a serious psychotic expisode
and involuntary hospitalization, would provide for an emergency commitment procedure similar to that established by the California Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. 08 It is essential to adapt such a provision
to the child's perception of time, and to ensure that no "emergency"
commitment extends for more than a few days without judicial scrutiny.
F.

Alternatives to Commitment

At each precommitment or postcommitment hearing the court
should review possible alternate treatment settings which would be less
restrictive than the proposed or current hospitalization. If commitment is to be ordered or continued, the judge should make a specific
finding that at the time of the hearing no alternative was available
for the child. Exploration of alternatives to hospitalization at periodic
intervals will encourage a more careful evaluation of the child's condition than if the hospital were merely required to demonstrate that the
child was still in need of treatment.
G.

The Standardfor Commitment

It has been persuasively argued that involuntary commitment for
reasons other than dangerousness to self or others-as where a patient
is described as "in need of treatment"-is unconstitutional. 00 While
only nine states limit adult involuntary commitments to dangerousness, 867 the argument against paternalistically institutionalizing people
"for their own good" seems compelling when the people involved are
adults. While some of the factors leading to this conclusion-limitations on the ability of psychiatrists to effectively treat, 30 or even correctly diagnose,80 9 mental problems-are equally applicable to juveniles, the "in need of treatment" standard may be more appropriate
for children. Treatment is more likely to be successful when the patient is young and the mental disorder is in its acute (early) stage.
There is also a recognized public interest in the future of children.
Such paternalism, where it does not run afoul of specific constitutional
365. CAL. WE.F. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5150, 5152 (West 1966).
366. N. Krrrnm, supra note 4, at 66-67. See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 329 F.
Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94 S.
Ct. 1078 (1974).
367. THE MENTALLY DIstALED AND T'sx LAw (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971),
supra note 365, at 36.
368. See Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effect Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936
(1974) (this issue).
369. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974) (this issue).

1974]

VOLUNTEERING CHILDREN

prohibitions, is supported by considerable authority.3 70 Children
could be committed under the "in need of treatment" standard, but
no child committed under that standard should have treatment continued involuntarily for more than six months. By comparison, under
a dangerousness standard a child might be hospitalized beyond that
time limit if necessary. This compromise recognizes that while the
state and the parents have a strong interest in providing involuntary
treatment for a child who needs it, this rationale loses force if the child
is still unwilling after a period of months, because treatment is unlikely
to be successful when the patient strongly and consistently opposes it.
The child's opposition to treatment and hospitalization is also a more
informed opposition when he or she has been in the treatment setting
for a period of months, and therefore later opposition should arguably
be given even greater weight than the child's initial reluctance to enter
the hospital. As with all time limits, the six month period is somewhat arbitrary, but even with children there must be some limitation
upon paternalistic incarceration.
H. The Standardof Proof
Several courts have recently held -that "proof beyond a reason71
able doubt" is constitutionally required in civil commitment cases.
The arguments advanced by these courts and various commentators
are based on persuasive analogies to similar requirements in criminal
cases. Similarly, while juvenile courts can obtain jurisdiction over children for incorrigible and predelinquent behavior, behavior which
would not be criminal if committed by adults, sanctions in all cases
must be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.3 72 When children
are committed under a standard of behavior different than that required of adults, the standard of proof must remain at a high level.
Arguments in favor of varying the standard of behavior should not be
forced into double duty; they do not justify both relaxing the standard
of commitment and enervating the standard of proof. Paternalism
may justify early treatment of disturbed children, but is misplaced
when it affects the precision required in proving that the need for
treatment does in fact exist.
370. For a discussion of the parens patriae doctrine, see N. KrrrRm, supra note
4, at 3-9.
371. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1078
(1974). Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in juvenile court cases.
372. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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X.
PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE

It has been argued in previous sections of this Article that the
current system of juvenile commitments to mental hospitals unconstitutionally abridges children's rights. Thus much of the discussion has
focused on litigation. But the task of devising a new system for providing treatment to juveniles will fall to the legislatures. This Model
Statute is an attempt to present a workable alternative to the present
system, an alternative which considers the need of some children for
involuntary treatment, the troubled situation in dysfunctional families,
and the right of children to -nfluence important events in their own
lives.

SECTION

I.

Purpose.

The purpose of this Act is to prevent the involuntary hospitalization of minors except when -treatment in a mental hospital is necessary.
If treatment is required under the terms of this Act, and if there exist
less drastic means of accomplishing therapeutic aims than hospitalization, those alternative means must be employed instead of hospitalization.
SECTION

II. Definitions.

a. Minor and child shall refer to any person under the age of
sixteen years. Any person over the age of sixteen shall come under
the commitment and admission statutes which apply to adults.
b. Parent shall refer to the natural or adoptive parent of the
child, if that person has custody of the child, or any other person who
has de facto custody of the child.
c. Mental hospital shall refer to any facility, whether operated
by federal, state or local government or by a private party or organization, which provides in-patient diagnostic and treatment services for
mental and emotional disorders.
d. Mental health professional shall refer to any psychiatrist, psy-

choanalyst, psychologist, psychotherapist, psychiatric social worker,
psychiatric nurse, or any other person whose professional occupation
consists of dealing with the problems of the mentally ill. It shall also
refer to any physician who is acting in a psychotherapeutic or counselling function.
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[e. Family Court shall refer to that court within a given jurisdiction which deals most frequently with family problems, such as marital, juvenile, and civil commitment matters.]
f. Imminent likelihood of serious harm to oneself means that it
is more likely than not that in the near future the person will attempt
to commit suicide or inflict serious bodily harm upon himself as manifested either (1) by behavior causing, attempting or threatening the
infliction of serious bodily harm upon himself by violent means within
thirty days prior to the filing of a petition for commitment or recommitment or (2) by nonviolent behavior which at the time the petition
for commitment or recommitment was filed was currently causing serious bodily harm.
g. Imminent likelihood of serious harm to others means that it
is more likely than not that in the near future the person will inflict
serious, unjustified bodily harm on another person, as manifested by
behavior causing, attempting to cause or threatening such harm, within
thirty days prior to the filing of a petition for commitment or recommitment that gives rise to a reasonable fear of such harm from said
person.
h. Mental disorder means a substantial disorder of the person's
emotional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs judgment, behavior or capacity to recognize reality.
SECTION III.

Right to Institutionalizationand Treatment.

Nothing in this Act is intended to establish or restrict any right
of minors to seek institutionalization or treatment over the objections.
or without the consent, of persons having custody over them.
SECTION IV.

The Commitment Process.

Any person having custody of a minor may seek to have that
minor committed to a mental hospital only according to the provisions
of this section.
a. Petition for commitment. The person seeking the commitment shall first file a petition for commitment of the minor with the
Family Court.
b. Appointed Counsel. The Family Court shall, upon receipt
of the petition, appoint counsel for the minor. The court shall give
preference to any attorney selected by the child, but if the child declines to select an attorney, or if the selected attorney is unavailable,
preference shall be given to attorneys who have experience in the
areas of mental health or juvenile law. In no case shall the child's
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attorney be a person who has previously advised the person seeking
the commitment of the minor or that person's business.
c. Representation by counsel. The clld shall at all times, before and after commitment, be represented by counsel.
d. Attorney's interview. The child's counsel shall interview the
child within two days after appointment by the Family Court, and shall
investigate the situation thoroughly enough to make an informed judgment about the true intent of the child to either contest or accept the
proposed commitment.
e. Waiver of hearing. If counsel for the child determines that
it is the intent of the child to waive the right to contest the commitment, counsel shall so declare in writing to the Family Court. A written statement verified by the attorney, describing the child's feelings
about the proposed hospitalization shall accompany the attorney's declaration. If the Family Court, upon receiving such a statement and
declaration from the child's attorney, is satisfied that ,he child has
knowingly waived the right to a hearing, the child may be hospitalized.
By waiving the right to a precommitment hearing, the child waives
no other rights.
f. Psychiatricinterview.
(1) The person seeking commitment of the child may designate
in the petition for commitment a particular institution to which commitment is sought. The child will be interviewed by a mental health
professional at this designated institution prior to the hearing for purposes of diagnosis and establishing a treatment plan, unless such an
interview would substantially duplicate any recent and similar interview.
(2) The child shall have the right to an interview with any mental health professional of his or -her choice prior to the hearing. Upon
the motion of the child, the court may order the person seeking commitment -to pay an amount, in the discretion of the court, reasonable
for a diagnostic interview, or in the case of financial hardship to such
person, the court will order the cost paid from public funds.
(3) A written report of any interview, held at any time, between
a child and a mental health professional shall be made available to
the child's attorney.
g. Custody pending hearing. Pending the commitment hearing, the child shall remain in the custody of the person seeking the
commitment, except as provided under section IV(i) of this Act, and
except that on noticed motion, the Family Court may order the child
placed in the custody of any other person, if the court -finds such a
change of custody would promote the best interests of the child.
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h. Scheduling of hearing. Unless a valid waiver is obtained in
compliance with the terms of section IV(e) of this Act, a commitment
hearing shall be held within ten days after the appointment of counsel,
or within five days of a commitment of .the child under section IV(i),
whichever is earlier.
i.

Emergency commitment.

(1) When any minor, as a result of a mental disorder, is imaninently likely to cause serious harm to others or to himself or herself,
a peace officer or any mental health professional may, upon reasonable
cause, take, or cause to be taken, the child into custody and placed
in a mental hospital, which shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which the child's condition was called to
the attention of the person seeking the commitment, and stating that
such person believes that the child is, as a result of mental disorder,
imminently -likelyto cause serious harm to others or to himself or herself.
(2) The child shall be released if, at any time, in the opinion
of the professional person in charge of the mental hospital, or a designee, the child no longer requires evaluation or treatment.
(3) If at the time of admission under this subsection a petition
for commitment of the child is not pending, -the following procedure
shall be followed. The hospital shall file a petition for commitment
pursuant to section IV(a) on the first working day after the admission of the child. The Family Court shall -then immediately appoint
an attorney pursuant to section IV(b). The attorney shall interview
the child and investigate the circumstances of the child's admission as
soon as possible. A commitment hearing shall be held within five
days after the filing of the petition.
SECTION

V.

The Commitment Hearing.

a. Rights at the hearing. At the commitment hearing, the child
shall at all times be represented by counsel; shall have the right to
present witnesses in opposition to the commitment, including mental
health professionals; shall have the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who favor the commitment; shall have the right to be personally present at the hearing; shall have a right to a written transcript
of the proceedings and the right to an expedited appeal of an adverse
ruling. The child shall have 'the right -to testify or to remain silent,
and cannot be forced to answer any question. Except as provided
in this Act, -the rules of evidence shall apply. The child shall also
have any other rights required by the United States or State constitutions.
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b. Authority of the hearing judge to call and question witnesses.
At the commitment hearing, the Family Court judge shall be empowered to call and question any witness, sua sponte, when the testimony
of such a witness may assist the determination of the necessity of the
proposed commitment.
c. Findings and order. The Family Court judge shall make an
order committing or recommitting the child to a mental hospital only
if it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the child needs and
will substantially benefit from -treatment or is in imminent danger of
causing serious harm to others or himself or herself; and (2) that no
other means of treatment is feasible which involves less restriction of
the child's liberty. No order of commitment shall be issued unless
evidence has been admitted showing that no less restrictive alternative
form of treatment is feasible for the child. The court shall consider
all possible treatment alternatives within the hospital as well as other
treatment alternatives. If the court orders the commitment of the
child, the order shall specify the treatment alternatives which the hospital may use.
d. Prompt adjudication. The Family Court judge shall determine in as short a time as possible whether the commitment is to be
ordered. In no case shall the judge extend deliberations and postpone
decision for a period exceeding ten days after the hearing. The decision shall be made within five days if, at the time of the commencement of the hearing, the child is in the custody of a mental hospital
pursuant to section IV(i).
SECTION

VI.

PeriodicJudicial Review.

a. Right to review. Every minor committed under this Act shall
have ,the necessity and terms of his or her commitment reviewed by
the Family Court in accordance with this section. Such review is a
matter of right and is not waivable.
b. Commitment period. For the purposes of this Act, a commitment period shall be forty-five days, except that when the child
attains the age of twelve, any commitment period commencing thereafter shall be ninety days. The first commitment period shall commence at the time the child is committed pursuant to this Act. Succeeding commitment periods shall commence at the termination of the
preceding commitment period.
c. Hearing. If the hospital staff, or the person who sought the
original commitment desires to have the hospitalization extended beyond the statutory commitment period, a petition for recommitment
must be filed with the Family Court at least fifteen days before 'the
expiration of the commitment period. If such a timely petition is filed,
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a recommitment hearing, which shall conform to -the specifications of
sections IV and V of this Act, shall be held during the last ten days
of the commitment period. After such a hearing, the judge shall order
the child released unless the recommitment is shown to be necessary
under the standards of section V(c).
VII. Limitation on the Institutionalization of Minors Committed Because of Need of Treatment.
SECTION

No child may be institutionalized in a mental hospital for a total
of more than two commitment periods where the basis of the commitment order is that the child is in need of treatment, rather than proven
imminent likelihood of serious harm to others or to himself or herself.
SECTION

VIII.

Patient-InitiatedRelease.

a. Form of notice. Notice of intent to withdraw may be given
by any minor patient committed pursuant to this Act or his or her
counsel. The notice need not follow any specific form so long as it
is written and the intent of the child can be discerned. The notice
may be written by a person other than the child if the child is unable
to write it. The notice may be given to any staff member of the hospital. The staff member receiving the notice shall immediately date
it, record its existence in 'the daily log of the ward and on the patient's
medical chart, and send copies of it to: (1) the child's attorney; (2)
the Family Court; and (3) to the parents or guardian of the child.
b. Uncontested releases The director of the hospital shall release the child from the hospital ten days after receipt of the child's
notice, unless either the hospital or the parent or guardian files a notice of contest within the ten-day period. For such a notice of contest
to be valid, copies must be personally delivered to the child, the child's
attorney, the Family Court, the child's parent or guardian, and the hospital, prior to the expiration of the ten days following the child's notice
of intend to withdraw.
c. Custody pending hearing. If a valid notice of contest has
been received, the director of the hospital may refuse to release the
patient until the Family Court orders otherwise. But in no case may
the child be held more than -fourteen days beyond the expiration of
his or her ten-day notice unless a valid recommitment order has been
issued by the Family Court.
d. Recommitment hearing. A hearing to determine the necessity for continued commitment shall be held within ten days of the
court's receipt of the notice of contest. The hearing will conform to
the requirements of section V of this Act. After such a hearing, the
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judge shall order the child released unless the commitment is shown
to be necessary under the standards of Section V(c).
e. Withdrawal of the child's notice. Once a child has submitted
a ten-day notice to this section, it cannot be withdrawn, and a hearing
must be held.
f. Limitation on child's notice rights. A child may not submit
more than one ten-day notice during any commitment period.
SECTION IX.

Attorney's Role During the Minor's Commitment.

a. Access to attorney. The child shall at all times have access
to means of communication with his or her appointed attorney, and
such communciations shall be privileged and secret from any other
person, including -theparents and the hospital staff.
b. Replacement of attorney. When the child's appointed attorney is unavailable, the court shall appoint a new attorney pursuant to
Section IV(b).
c. Power to petition. The attorney shall also be empowered to
petition the court at any time regarding any unlawful conditions or
practices at the hospital involving the child.
d. Access to the child. The child's attorney shall have the right
to enter the hospital at any time to inspect conditions, or, at any time
reasonable under the circumstances, to interview or observe the child.
SECTION

X.

ParentalTreatment.

If a parent seeks, or causes any other person to seek, the commitment of a child under this Act, 'the hospital and/or the Family Court
may require that -the parent participate in any reasonable program of
family treatment or counselling as may be appropriate. No person
may be committed to a mental hospital under this section.

